Copyright © 2020 Mitali Nagrecha, Sharon Brett & Colin Doyle.
 See generally Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Ending Mass Incarceration: Ideas from Today’s Leaders (Inimai Chettiar & Priya Raghavan, eds., 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_EndingMassIncarceration_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/4F7N-9Y9X]; The Sentencing Project, To Build a Better Criminal Justice System: 25 Experts Envision the Next 25 Years of Reform (Marc Mauer & Katie Epstein, eds., 2012), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/To-Build-a-Better-Criminal-Justice-System.pdf [https://perma.cc/LU4P-QA9F].
 See, e.g., Overview, Stan. Law Sch.: Three Strikes Project, https://law.stanford.edu/stanford-justice-advocacy-project/#slsnav-litigation-reform-education [https://perma.cc/82GG-EXBZ] (last accessed Mar. 15, 2020) (describing litigation efforts on behalf of individuals sentenced pursuant to the three strikes law in California); James Cullen, Sentencing Laws and How They Contribute to Mass Incarceration, Brennan Ctr. for Just. (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/sentencing-laws-and-how-they-contribute-mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/4KUG-S9F3] (explaining how mandatory minimums, truth-in-sentencing, and three strikes laws have contributed to mass incarceration); Wendy Sawyer & Pete Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, Prison Pol’y Initiative (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019.html [https://perma.cc/JRM2-VDQN] (breaking down the reasons for mass incarceration and explaining the role that excessive periods of supervision play in driving up the number of people incarcerated each year); Excessive Punishment, Equal Just. Initiative, https://eji.org/issues/excessive-punishment [https://perma.cc/9N25-8SNR] (last accessed Mar. 15, 2020) (listing EJI’s work on ending excessive sentences for drug offenses, challenging three strikes laws, and combating truth-in-sentencing regime).
 See generally Sharon Brett & Mitali Nagrecha, Criminal Justice Policy Program, Harvard Law Sch., Proportionate Financial Sanctions: Policy Prescriptions For Judicial Reform 8 (2019) (noting legislative reforms to systems of monetary sanctions enacted over the last few years in Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, and Arizona); Colin Doyle, Chiraag Bains & Brook Hopkins, Bail Reform: A Guide for State and Local Policymakers (2019) (describing recent reform efforts and providing guidance to state and local policymakers interested in bail reform).
 See, e.g., Dade v. City of Sherwood, No. 16-cv-602, 2017 WL 2486078, at *1 (E.D. Ark. June 8, 2017); Feenstra v. Sigler, No. cv-2019-12 (Wash. Cty. Dist. Court, Okla. Mar. 21, 2019); Brown v. Lexington Cty., No. 17-cv-1426, 2018 WL 15556189, *2–5 (D.S.C. Mar. 29, 2018); Brett & Nagrecha, supra note 3, at 1–2.
 Brett & Nagrecha, supra note 3, at 42–45 (describing punitive enforcement measures imposed on individuals who lack the ability to pay their fines and fees); Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 277, 291 (2014) (arguing that inability to pay means that punishment for even minor offenses becomes compounded and unending); Criminal Justice Policy Program, Harvard Law Sch., Confronting Criminal Justice Debt: A Guide for Policy Reform 15 (2016) (describing how individuals who cannot afford their fines and fees face “poverty traps” in the form of additional fees or penalties).
 See, e.g., Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. § 42.15 (West 2017); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. § 875.1 (2018); Ariz. Supreme Court, Bench Card for Ability to Pay at Time of Sentencing in Criminal Cases and Civil Traffic Cases (2017), https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/22/admorder/Orders17/2017-81%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/RW2P-LD23].
 See Criminal Justice Policy Program, Harvard Law Sch., Moving Beyond Money: A Primer on Bail Reform 4 (2016) [hereinafter Bail Reform Primer]; Curtis E.A. Karnow, Setting Bail for Public Safety, 13 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 1, 20 (2008).
 See Doyle, Bains & Hopkins, supra note 3, at 12–13.
 pan> . Todd D. Minton & Zhen Zeng, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Jail Inmates at Midyear 2014, at 1 (2015); Roy Walmsley, World Pre-trial/Remand Imprisonment List 1 (3d. ed. 2016).
 Ram Subramanian, Ruth Delaney, Stephen Roberts, Nancy Fishman & Peggy McGarry, Vera Inst. of Justice, Incarceration’s Front Door: The Misuse of Jails in America 29 (2015), http://www.safetyandjusticechallenge.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/incarcerations-front-door-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EMC-PA3H]; Megan Stevenson & Sandra Mayson, Pretrial Detention and Bail, in 3 Reforming Criminal Justice 21–23 (Erik Luna, ed., 2019), https://law.asu.edu/sites/default/files/pdf/academy_for_justice/Reforming-Criminal-Justice_Vol_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6PV-GGHX].
 See Doyle, Bains & Hopkins, supra note 3, at 13, 72 (describing the use of actuarial risk assessment tools by counties in Wisconsin and ability-to-pay reforms in Cook County, Illinois).
 Andrea M. Marsh, Rethinking Driver’s License Suspensions for Nonpayment of Fines and Fees, in Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, 2017 Trends in State Courts, Fines, Fees, and Bail Practices: Challenges and Opportunities 23 (2017); see also Resources, Free to Drive (Jan. 16, 2020, 4:33 PM), https://www.freetodrive.org/resources/#page-content [https://perma.cc/4Z9W-8L9E] (describing national campaign to end drivers’ license suspensions due to outstanding court debt).
 See Brett & Nagrecha, supra note 3, at 9, 13–14 (noting that most current state laws “invite bias and speculation” and rely on judges’ discretion to determine ability to pay); Beth A. Colgan, Graduating Economic Sanctions According to Ability to Pay, 103 Iowa L. Rev. 53, 81–86 (2017) (discussing issues with applying ability-to-pay guidelines, and problems that arise when judges speculate about income).
 See Jocelyn Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice Through Contestation and Resistance, 111 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1609, 1624 (2017) (arguing that legal scholars “have a responsibility to study and support marginalized and disenfranchised groups as they create” a new and reimagined system for public safety).
 Arthur J. Goldberg, Equal Justice for the Poor, Too, N.Y. Times, March 15, 1964, at 24, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1964/03/15/106946833.html?page¬Number=281 [https://perma.cc/C74H-SH5K].
 See Alexes Harris, Heather Evans & Katherine Beckett, Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary United States, 115 Am. J. Soc. 1753, 1755 (2010) (acknowledging how criminal justice decision-makers have begun “to impose a growing number of monetary sanctions on people who are convicted—and sometimes merely accused—of crimes”); Emma Anderson, Alyson Hurt & Joseph Shapiro, State-by-State Court Fees, NPR (May 19, 2014, 4:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312455680/state-by-state-court-fees [https://perma.cc/K4VM-CKSZ] (showing rise in court fees charged to defendants across the country).
 Subramanian et al., supra note 10, at 29.
 Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, Prison Pol’y Initiative (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019.html [https://perma.cc/JRM2-VDQN].
 See Harris et al., supra note 16, at 1756–59, 1769 (explaining categories of monetary sanctions and how amounts have increased over time).
 Compare Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 45.0491 (West 2020) (allowing for waiver of monetary sanctions if a person is indigent or cannot pay, and where payment would impose an undue hardship on the individual), and Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 37.65(c) (providing that the judge shall waive, lower, or modify “any fine, fee, or cost or the amount previously assessed and due” if the judge “finds the defendant does not have the ability to pay the amount when assessed or due and is unable to acquire the resources to pay”), with Iowa Code Ann. § 910.2 (West 2013) (making fines, penalties, and some surcharges considered mandatory debts which are not waivable), and Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-603(C),13-804(C)–(E) (2013) (requiring that courts in criminal cases impose “the full amount of the economic loss to the victim as determined by the court and in the manner as determined by the court or the court’s designee”).
 See Brett & Nagrecha, supra note 3, at 12–14 (describing barriers preventing judges from exercising full discretion to waive or suspend enforcement of fees).
 Alicia Bannon, Mitali Nagrecha & Rebekah Diller, Brennan Ctr. For Justice, Criminal Justice Debt: A Barrier to Reentry 10–11, 20–22 (2010) (describing how individuals with outstanding court debt are often subjected to harsh enforcement mechanisms including warrants, arrest, incarceration, and more).
 Fines and fees can be assessed for municipal ordinance violations, traffic tickets, misdemeanor charges, and felony charges. The amount and type of monetary sanctions imposed will vary from state to state and offense to offense, but common examples include clerk fees, transcript or processing fees, warrant fees, and in many jurisdictions, fees associated with the provision of appointed counsel (sometimes called “indigent defense reimbursement fees”) or time spent in jail awaiting adjudication (often “room and board fees”).
 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department 10–12, 42 (2015) [hereinafter DOJ Ferguson Report], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7KW-T9D3].
 Chief Justice Says Up To $350,000 Needed for Courts, Pine Bluff Com. (Jan 24, 2012, 7:52 AM), https://www.pbcommercial.com/sections/news/state/chief-justice-says-350000-needed-courts.html [https://perma.cc/F3ZR-E4X4].
 Bill Bowden, Unpaid Court Fees Split Carroll County Officials, Ark. Democrat-Gazette (July 3, 2014), http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2014/jul/03/unpaid-court-fees-split-carroll-county- [https://perma.cc/M3Y6-MT48]. However, the push to use courts as revenue generators/collectors is not unique to Arkansas, or to the era immediately following the 2008 financial crisis. A diverse literature in the 1990s taught courts and probation to collect more. See, e.g., Dale Parent, Dep’t of Justice, Nat’l Inst. for Justice Office of Justice Programs, Recovering correctional costs through offender fees 1 (1990) (concluding user fees were a promising and significant source of revenue and recommending better tracking systems for better collections). For many years, it has been considered normal, and indeed desirable, to encourage courts to bring in more money.
 Minton & Zeng, supra note 9, at 1; Walmsley, supra note 9, at 1.
 Walmsley, supra note 9, at 13; Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Does the United States Really Have 5 Percent of the World’s Population and One Quarter of the World’s Prisoners, Wash. Post (Apr. 30, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/04/30/does-the-united-states-really-have-five-percent-of-worlds-population-and-one-quarter-of-the-worlds-prisoners/?utm_term=.d10281e3c39c [https://perma.cc/4K37-LPM9].
 Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, Prison Policy Initiative (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019.html [https://perma.cc/JRM2-VDQN].
 See Bail Reform Primer, supra note 7, at 4–8.
 Id. at 5–6.
 See, e.g., Ky R. Crim. P. 4.06; D.C. Code Ann. § 23-1322 (West 2001); N.M. Const. art. II, § 13.
 See, e.g., Ky R. Crim. P. 4.06; N.M. Const. art. II, § 13. But see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:162-18 (West 2017) (allowing courts to detain people “charged with any crime”).
 See, e.g., N.J. Ct. R. 3:4-2 (c)(1)(B), (c)(2); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:162-16, -18 (West 2017); see also Alexander Shalom, Colvette Tvedt, Joseph E. Krakora & Diane D. Price, Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.J., The New Jersey Pretrial Justice Manual 26 (2016).
 See, e.g., Sheriff’s Justice inst., Cook Cty., Central Bond Court Report 1–2 (2016), https://www.chicagoreader.com/pdf/20161026/Sheriff_s-Justice-Institute-Central-Bond-Court-Study-070616.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4XS-CQ6T].
 Bail Reform Primer, supra note 7, at 11–12.
 See id. at 11 (“[B]y setting out a simple matrix of offenses and corresponding dollar amounts, bail schedules do not allow for meaningful individualized considerations of a defendant’s circumstances.”).
 See generally Timothy R. Schnacke, A Brief History of Bail, 57 Judges’ J. 4 (2018) (using the history of bail to address American pretrial justice concerns). Commercial bail bond companies—businesses that extract a fee from defendants in exchange for posting a full bond amount—are a relatively recent phenomenon of the last century. Id. at 7. The presence of commercial sureties undoubtedly influences how bail is imposed and the financial impact of bail on poor communities. There is no doubt that the bail bond industry is a powerful lobbying presence in many states and strongly opposes the elimination of money bail. See, e.g., Michael Dresser, After Revelations in Oaks Case, Advocates Urge Lawmakers to Avoid Bail-Bond Industry Lobbyists, Balt. Sun (Jan. 10, 2018, 2:20 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/bs-md-bail-bond-avoid-20180110-story.html [https://perma.cc/Z9XZ-EPZR] (reporting alleged bribe from bail-bond industry representative to Senator Nathaniel Oaks). But the presence of commercial sureties does little to explain why judges have increasingly turned to money bail as a means of preventive detention. Bail bond companies make no money from people who remain in jail—their profits are tied to the people who are able to afford to pay a fee and bond out.
 Doyle, Bains & Hopkins, supra note 3, at 7.
 See Bail Reform Primer, supra note 7, at 7 (citing state efforts to encourage risk assessment tools and to “end the use of secured money bail in certain situations for arrestees who are unable to pay”).
 See, e.g., La. Code. Crim. Proc. Ann. § 875.1(C)–(D) (2019) (requiring that, “prior to ordering the imposition or the enforcement of [financial sanctions] . . . the court shall determine whether payment in full . . . would cause substantial financial hardship to the defendant or his dependents”); Supplement to the Settlement Agreement at 21, Kennedy v. Biloxi, No. 1:15-cv-00348-HSO-JCG (S.D. Miss. 27, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/supplement-kennedy-v-biloxi-settlement-agreement [https://perma.cc/77NP-L3VL] (outlining factors for judges to consider in determining ability to pay); Mecklenburg Cty. Dist. Court, Bench Card: Imposition of Fines, Costs, Fees, and Restitution (2018), https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/content/uploads/2018/11/Mecklenburg-Final-Imposition-Bench-Card-10.16.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FML-9HCJ].
 Nonpayment can lead to warrants, arrest, periods of incarceration, loss of driving privileges, and more. See Brett & Nagrecha, supra note 3, at 30–31.
 See, e.g., H.R. 16-1311, 69th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2016) (eliminating use of warrants to respond to nonpayment); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 37.65 (requiring that the court use show cause orders rather than arrest warrants to secure appearance upon nonpayment).
 See, e.g., Ariz. Supreme Court, Bench Card for ARS § 13-810 Order to Show Cause Hearings (OSC), Lawful Collection of Legal Financial Obligations 3 (2017), https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/22/admorder/Orders17/2017-81%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/RW2P-LD23] (allowing the court to arrest and incarcerate for nonpayment if the court first holds a hearing and finds nonpayment was willful or due to “an intentional failure to make bona fide efforts to pay”).
 See, e.g., S. 144, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
 See, e.g., Orleans Parish, LA: Bail, Civil Rights Corps (2019), https://www.civilrightscorps.org/work/case/orleans-parish-la-bail [https://perma.cc/2KTD-2VZ5].
 See, e.g., S. 572, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016) (precluding individuals from being jailed for failure to pay a fine unless nonpayment violated the terms of their probation); Haley Holik & Marc Levin, Tex. Pub. Policy Found., Confronting the Burden of Fines and Fees on Fine-Only Offenses in Texas: Recent Reforms and Next Steps 1–5 (2019) (describing recent legislative reforms in Texas that require courts to consider whether nonpayment was willful); see also Criminal Justice Policy Program, Survey to Fees and Fines Advocacy Community (2019) (on file with authors) (finding that the vast majority of respondents were targeting ability to pay reforms).
 See generally Doyle, Bains & Hopkins, supra note 3, at 10–26. Despite the rallying cry to end money bail, all fifty states still permit money bail. California may be poised to be the first state to officially eliminate money bail. See S. 10, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (authorizing California’s transition from a money-based release system to a risk-based release and detention system). Recent reforms in New Jersey have caused money bail to be strongly disfavored and have eliminated money bail as a means of pretrial detention. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:162-15 (West 2017) (“Monetary bail may be set for an eligible defendant only when it is determined that no other conditions of release will reasonably assure the eligible defendant’s appearance in court when required.”).
 Laura & John Arnold Found., Research Summary: Developing a National Model for Pretrial Risk Assessment 2 (2013).
 Chelsea Barabas, Karthik Dinakar & Colin Doyle, The Problems with Risk Assessment Tools, N.Y. Times (July 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/17/opinion/pretrial-ai.html [https://perma.cc/AL6M-QDVG].
 See, e.g., Laura & John Arnold Found., Public Safety Assessment: Decision Making Framework – Cook County, IL 1–2 (2016) (on file with authors).
 See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:162-16, -18 (West 2017).
 See, e.g., Circuit Court of Cook County, General Order No. 18.8A (2017), http://www.cookcountycourt.org/Manage/DivisionOrders/ViewDivisionOrder/tabid/298/ArticleId/2562/GENERAL-ORDER-NO-18-8A-Procedures-for-Bail-Hearings-and-Pretrial-Release.aspx [https://perma.cc/F238-NKGP]; Doyle, Bains & Hopkins, supra note 3, at 10–13.
 Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 Minn. L. Rev. 303, 308–09 (2018). Algorithmic risk assessments may not be helping bail reform take root. Pretrial risk assessments may not actually reduce pretrial incarceration and are likely to perpetuate biases in the criminal history data used to train these tools. A deeper discussion of risk assessments is beyond the scope of this Essay, but the tools have also faced sustained criticism concerning their design, accuracy, implementation, transparency, and equity along race, class, and gender lines. See Chelsea Barabas, Karthik Dinakar & Colin Doyle, Technical Flaws of Pretrial Risk Assessments Raise Grave Concerns, MIT Media Lab (July 17, 2019), https://www.media.mit.edu/posts/algorithmic-risk-assessment [https://perma.cc/NG24-S229].
 Special Comm’n on Bail Reform, Final Report of the Special Commission to Evaluate Policies and Procedures Related to the Current Bail System, Exhibit C at 2 (2020), https://d279m997dpfwgl.cloudfront.net/wp/2020/01/0102_bail-reform-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2DN-GHK9].
 The Coalition to End Money Bail, Shifting Sands: An Investigation Into The First Year of Bond Reform in Cook County 8, 15 (2018), https://chicagobond.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/shiftingsands.pdf [https://perma.cc/ELY4-JSG7].
 See generally Cindy Redcross & Brit Henderson, MDRC Ctr. for Criminal Justice Research, Evaluation of Pretrial Justice System Reforms that Use the Public Safety Assessment (2019).
 Jordan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 255, 257 (Ark. 1997); see also Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983) (requiring states to consider alternative measures of punishment other than imprisonment when a defendant’s failure to pay is not willful).
 Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-205(f)(3) (2013); Jordan, 939 S.W.2d at 257 (“Considerations such as those enumerated in Ark. Code Ann. [§ 5-4-205(f)(3)] . . . are required before probation is revoked.”); LeFlore v. State, No. CACR 11-685, 2012 WL 1869565, at *3 (Ark. Ct. App. May 23, 2012) (“In determining whether to revoke probation for nonpayment, the court is required to consider the defendant’s employment status, earning ability, financial resources, the willfulness of the defendant’s failure to pay, and any other special circumstances that may have a bearing on the defendant’s ability to pay.”).
 Hoffman v. State, 711 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Ark. 1986) (quotation omitted).
 See, e.g., Dade v. City of Sherwood, No. 16-cv-602, 2017 WL 2486078 (E.D. Ark. June 8, 2017). In 2016, in response to a lawsuit against the City of Sherwood, Arkansas, for allegedly running an unconstitutional debtor’s prison, the state created a statewide committee of district and circuit court judges to propose policy changes to the bench. See U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Targeted Fines and Fees Against Communities of Color: Civil Rights & Constitutional Implications 51–52 (2017), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2017/Statutory_Enforcement_Report2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8RE-Y8EB]. This committee sent a signal to judges across the state that judicial leadership was responding to the federal law suit proactively. See id. Yet, it remains unclear whether or how the statewide committee will change state policy on the issue, and whether judges will willingly apply any new policies that are promulgated.
 See Joseph v. State, 577 S.W. 3d 55, 59 (Ark. Ct. App. 2019) (affirming the trial court’s conclusion that the defendant did not make sufficient bona fide efforts to pay off court debt because he “clearly had the ability to work” as he was employed before he was incarcerated, earned his GED while incarcerated, and was able to pay for a cell phone and cable television).
 State law in California, for example, requires ability-to-pay determinations prior to imposing fees, yet one study of practices in Alameda County found that such determinations rarely occurred. As a result, the average adult is charged over $6,000 in fees alone, despite the fact that many have no financial ability to pay such amounts. Theresa Zhen & Brandon Greene, E. Bay Cmty. Law Center., Pay or Prey: How the Alameda County Criminal Justice System Extracts Wealth from Marginalized Communities 2 (2018), https://ebclc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/EBCLC_CrimeJustice_WP_Fnl.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AYA-86ZD].
 See, e.g., N.M. CT. R. 5-401(C).
 Glenn A. Grant, Criminal Justice Reform Report to the Governor and the Legislature for Calendar Year 2017, at 4 (2017), https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/2017cjrannual.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FDN-YPK6].
 Has Bail Reform Been a Success? Check the Crime Numbers, Then Decide, NJ.com (Dec. 05, 2018), https://www.nj.com/opinion/2018/12/has_bail_reform_been_a_success_check_the_crime_num.html [https://perma.cc/8AQ3-AV2W].
 Doyle, Bains & Hopkins, supra note 3, at 45–49.
 See Grant, supra note 66, at 4, 14 (noting that “prosecutors filed 19,366 motions for pretrial detention” while “142,663 defendants issued a complaint-warrant or a complaint-summons”).
 See id. (explaining that judges detained only 8,043 defendants of the 19,366 defendants that prosecutors sought to detain).
 These 6,000 cases do not include prosecutors’ requests for detention that prosecutors later withdrew or that judges dismissed outright. Id. at 14.
 Judiciary Releases Annual Criminal Justice Reform Report, N.J. Courts (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.njcourts.gov/pressrel/2019/pr040219a.pdf [https://perma.cc/TC5C-KTZ6].
 The reasons for the cultural change are not self-evident and merit further study. One possible reason is judicial education. Unlike other states, New Jersey’s reforms were accompanied by a vast education program that reached nearly every public servant involved in the bail process, including judges. Much of the reduction in the pretrial jail population occurred after educational programs had happened but before statutory reforms became law.
 DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 24, at 3–4.
 Nick Sibilla, Federal Court Declares New Orleans Debtor’s Prison Unconstitutional, Forbes (Aug. 30, 2019, 12:44 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/2019/08/30/federal-court-declares-new-orleans-debtors-prison-unconstitutional/#155eb38d221f [https://perma.cc/MP3A-EAPT].
 See generally DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 24, at 42 (describing how the City of Ferguson relied on revenue raised through traffic and municipal fines and fees to fund court operations).
 Cain v. White, 937 F.3d 446, 449–50 (5th Cir. 2019).
 Id. at 450.
 Chief Justice Says Up To $350,000 Needed for Courts, Pine Bluff Com. (Jan. 24, 2012, 7:52 AM), https://www.pbcommercial.com/sections/news/state/chief-justice-says-350000-needed-courts.html [https://perma.cc/R6MF-WPRY].
 Ronald Kessler, I Set a Defendant Free and Got Blamed When He Raped Someone,
Marshall Project (Aug. 31, 2017, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/08/31/i-set-a-defendant-free-and-got-blamed-when-he-raped-someone [https://perma.cc/TJX9-XBZG].
 See Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 417, 426–32 (2016) (identifying this as a principle-agent problem and exploring the issue in depth).
 See generally Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges’ Voting, 38 J. L. Stud. 169 (2009) (finding that judicial voting is correlated with the political preferences of the electorate).
 Adeel Hassan, 17 Black Women Sweep to Judgeships in Texas County, N.Y. Times (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/09/us/black-female-judges-texas-election.html [https://perma.cc/X9RL-GPM5].
 See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. § 22-1-10(B)(1) (2019) (“No person is eligible to hold the office of magistrate who is not at the time of his appointment a citizen of the United States and of this State, and who has not been a resident of this State for at least five years, has not attained the age of twenty-one years upon his appointment, and has not received a high school diploma or its equivalent educational training as recognized by the State Department of Education.”).
 See, e.g., Rick Brundrett, Senators Continue Tradition of Keeping Magistrates on Short Leashes, Nerve (Feb. 5, 2019), https://thenerve.org/senators-continue-tradition-of-keeping-magistrates-on-short-leashes [https://perma.cc/W9Y4-524F].
 See, e.g., Nancy Gertner, Opinions I Should Have Written, 110 Nw. U. L. Rev. 423, 428 (2016); see generally Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (2007) (describing how judges need to use deliberation to check their intuition, and to do so, must be afforded more time to make decisions, write opinions more often, be trained on disciplines such as statistics, and rely on scripts, checklists, and other tools instead of their own guts and memories).
 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2018).
 See, e.g., Parsons v. State, 347 S.E.2d 504, 504 (S.C. 1986) (dismissing appeal from an order denying bail as “not directly appealable”). But see Dotson v. Clark, 900 F.2d 77, 78 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that “habeas corpus bail decisions are appealable”).
 See, e.g., State v. Steele, 61 A.3d 174, 180 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013) (“The setting of bail is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court, and we consequently review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion.”).
 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005) (affirming that “[t]he courts of appeals review sentencing decisions for unreasonableness”).
 See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text.
 See supra Part I.A (providing examples of required procedures and excessive pretrial detention rates around the country).
 See, e.g., Tana Ganeva, The Fight to End Cash Bail, 2019 Stan. Soc. Innov. Rev. 18, 24 (discussing recent bail reforms in New York, which Bronx Freedom Fund Executive Director Elena Weissmann notes have been implemented at a glacial pace, in part because of the fact that court “culture eats policy,” meaning it is hard to actually implement policy reforms at the ground level); N.J. Wikler, The Economics of Divorce, 25 Judge’s J. 9, 49 (1968) (discussing how, in the child support context, judicial “guidelines themselves will not make a difference without a corresponding change in the way that judges see the problem. Unless judges come to realize the degree of inequality . . . the guidelines will be ignored, or used as ceilings—a practice which would be quite unjustified”).
 See The Sentencing Project, Report of the Sentencing Project to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance: Regarding Racial Disparities in the United States Criminal Justice System 1 (2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/UN-Report-on-Racial-Disparities.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZA4M-EGYU] (“As of 2001, one of every three black boys born in that year could expect to go to prison in his lifetime, . . . compared to one of every seventeen white boys.”); Lynn Langton & Matthew Durose, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Police Behavior During Traffic and Street Stops, 2011, at 1 (2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pbtss11.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KGU-93ER] (“White drivers were both ticketed and searched at lower rates than black and Hispanic drivers.”); Stephen Demuth & Darrell Steffensmeier, The Impact of Gender and Race-Ethnicity in the Pretrial Release Process, 51 Soc. Probs. 222, 226 (2004) (“Research on labeling and stereotyping of black and Hispanic offenders reveals that court officials (and society-at-large) often view them as violent-prone, threatening, disrespectful of authority, and more criminal in their lifestyles . . . .”); Jessica Eaglin & Danyelle Solomon, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Reducing Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Jails: Recommendations for Local Practice 13 (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Racial%20Disparities%20Report%20062515.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZAK-NSWQ] (“African Americans are jailed at almost four times the rate of whites.”); M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences, 122 J. Pol. Econ. 1320, 1320 (2014) (“Across the distribution, blacks receive sentences that are almost 10 percent longer than those of comparable whites arrested for the same crimes.”); Marc Mauer, Justice for All? Challenging Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System, 37 Hum. Rts. 14, 14 (2010) (“[N]early 40 percent of the racial disparity in incarceration today cannot be explained by differential offending patterns.”).
 David Arnold, Will Dobbie & Crystal S. Yang, Racial Bias in Bail Decisions, 133 Q. J. Econ. 1885, 1888–90 (2018).
 Id. at 1885–86.
 Demuth & Steffensmeier, supra note 96, at 222.
 Michael W. Sances & Hye Young You, Who Pays for Government? Descriptive Representation and Exploitative Revenue Sources, 79 J. Pol. 1090, 1092–93 (2017).
 Liana Fiol Matta, Knowing the Communities We Serve, 49 Ct. Rev. 14 (2013).
 See Mitali Nagrecha, Criminal Justice Policy Program, Harvard Law Sch., The Limits of Fairer Fines: Lessons from Germany (forthcoming Spring 2020).
 Data reflects a large disconnect between the amount of money bail set for individuals nation-wide and the amount of money most criminal defendants can afford to pay. Nationwide in 2009, the median cash bail amount in felony cases was $11,700, increasing on average between 33 and 67 percent since 1992, depending on the type of crime. See Patrick Liu, Ryan Nunn & Jay Shambaugh, Hamilton Project, The Economics of Bail and Pretrial Detention 7 (2018), https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/BailFineReform_EA_121818_6PM.pdf . A quarter of defendants had bail set at $25,000 or more, even for property, drug, or “public order” crimes. See id. Yet a recent study of two major metropolitan areas found that the average person involved in the criminal-legal system earned less than $7,000 a year, and more than half of those people were unable to afford their bail even if it was set at $5,000 or less. Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin & Crystal S. Yang, The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 Am. Econ. Rev. 201, 201–40 (2018).
 See generally Max Schanzenbach, Racial and Sex Disparities in Prison Sentences: The Effect of District-Level Judicial Demographics, 34 J. Legal Stud. 57, 60–85 (2005) (examining racial and sex disparities in federal trial court prison sentencing cases); Max Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines: Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 715, 734–36 (2008) (examining the decision making of Democratic- and Republican- appointed federal trial judges in federal sentencing cases); Crystal S. Yang, Have Interjudge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory Guidelines Regime? Evidence from Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1268, 1276 (2014) (examining federal trial court discretion in sentencing cases).
 See, e.g., Shepherd, supra note 84, at 171 (examining the influence of political retention voting on state supreme court judges); Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 88, at 19 (“[W]e have conducted several studies involving hundreds of federal and state trial judges around the nation, and we have found that judges commonly encounter stimuli on the job that induce intuitive reactions, though they occasionally demonstrate an ability to override those intuitive responses.”).
 Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 831, 835 n.17 (2008).
 See, e.g., Jonathan Kastellec, Racial Diversity and Judicial Influence on Appellate Courts, 57 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 167, 179 (2013) (finding that “black judges [on federal appellate courts] are much more likely than nonblack judges to support affirmative action plans”); Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy: Discrimination, Experience, and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 313, 339 (2012) (finding that federal trial court judges who were members of a minority group disposed of employment civil rights cases at the summary judgment stage less often than white judges); Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29–45, 51–53 (2008) (finding a strong relationship between the race of federal trial and appellate judges and their decision making in Voting Rights Act cases); see also Miles & Sunstein, supra note 106, at 840 (observing that individual characteristics, including race and gender, impact federal appellate judges’ voting patterns, but this effect is not universal across all case types).
 See, e.g., Yang, supra note 104, at 1277 (finding that “female judges and Democratic-appointed judges issue shorter sentences and are more likely to depart downward from the Guidelines after Booker, compared to their male and Republican-appointed peers”); Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 389, 401 (2010) (finding that in federal appellate cases, “[o]n average, the probability of female judges voting in favor of the plaintiff in a sex discrimination case is around 0.10 higher than it is for male judges”); Jennifer L. Peresie, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 Yale L.J. 1759, 1761 (2005) (finding that a significant relationship existed between gender and individual federal appellate judges’ decisions in sex discrimination and sexual harassment cases); Max Schanzenbach, supra note 104, at 57, 60–85 (finding that “[f]or serious offenses, increasing the proportion of female judges in a [federal] district decreases the sex disparity” in prison sentencing cases); see also Miles & Sunstein, supra note 106, at 840 (noting that in certain kinds of cases, a judge’s sex affects their voting patterns).
 See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 106 at 840 (highlighting research that “a judge’s race does not exert a meaningful influence in employment discrimination cases, an area where one might predict race would be particularly salient. In contrast, race matters in voting rights cases; African American judges are more likely to vote in favor of plaintiffs, and white judges are more likely to vote in favor of plaintiffs if an African American judge is sitting on the panel”).
 See, e.g., Elliot Ash, Daniel L. Chen & Suresh Naidu, Ideas Have Consequences: The Impact of Law and Economics on American Justice 34 (March 20, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), http://elliottash.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/ash-chen-naidu-2019-03-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QJ5-H2RP] (concluding that federal trial and appellate judges who have been trained in economics “render conservative vote and verdicts, are against regulation and criminal appeals, and mete harsher criminal sentences and deterrence reasoning”); Karl S. Coplan, Legal Realism, Innate Morality, and the Structural Role of the Supreme Court in the U.S. Constitutional Democracy, 86 Tul. L. Rev. 181, 216 (2011) (positing that “individual moral intuition plays a role at least as important as rule-based legal reasoning in the decision-making process of Supreme Court Justices engaged in constitutional judicial review”).
 See, e.g., Kastellec, supra note 107, at 179 (finding that “the random assignment of a black judge to a three-judge panel in affirmative action cases nearly ensures that the panel will issue a liberal decision”); Boyd, Epstein & Martin, supra note 108, at 406 (finding that in federal appeals courts, “the likelihood of a male judge ruling in favor of the plaintiff increases by 12% to 14% [in sex discrimination cases] when a female sits on the panel”); Cox & Miles, supra note 107, at 26 (finding that “as more Democratic appointees were added to a panel, the rate at which a judge voted to impose liability rose” in federal Voting Rights Act cases).
 See, e.g., Yang, supra note 104, at 1277 (finding that female judges and Democratic-appointed judges give shorter sentences and are more likely to depart downward from the guidelines after Booker, compared to their male and Republican-appointed peers); Shepherd, supra note 84, at 171 (finding that state supreme court “[j]udges facing Republican retention agents tend to vote in accord with standard Republican policy” and that “[t]he mirror image applies for judges facing retention decisions by Democrats”); Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 104, at 734–36 (finding patterns based on political appointment in sentencing determinations); Miles & Sunstein, supra note 106, at 838–41 (finding that in many areas of the law, party affiliation by proxy of appointing president has a measurable effect on appellate voting patterns).
 Mary K. Ramirez, Into the Twilight Zone: Informing Judicial Discretion in Federal Sentencing, 57 Drake L. Rev. 591, 609 (2009).
 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 88, at 36–37. But see Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 96 Geo. L.J. 1283, 1286 (2008) (describing how, “[i]n most cases the process of writing will improve the underlying decision, or at worst will have no effect on it,” but “[s]ome types of decisions are susceptible to what psychologists refer to as ‘verbal overshadowing,’” where being required to justify a decision may negatively impact the decision made).
 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 88, at 35.
 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1195, 1230 (2009).
 Id. at 1230–31.
 See, e.g., Melissa L. Breger, Making the Invisible Visible: Exploring Implicit Bias, Judicial Diversity, and the Bench Trial, 53 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1039, 1083 (2019) (acknowledging that recognizing implicit bias may help judges overcome it, while also advocating for more research into the ways that increasing diversity on the bench could decrease implicit bias); Ramirez, supra note 113, at 596, 641 (arguing there is an increased need for judges to be educated on biases, “particularly the influence of race, gender, class, and culture” in the wake of Booker, so that judges have “tools for self-examination”); John F. Irwin & Daniel L. Real, Unconscious Influences on Judicial Decision-Making: The Illusion of Objectivity, 42 McGeorge L. Rev. 1, 8 (2010) (“Training about implicit biases in general, how they most likely influence judicial decision-making and how their impact can be minimized, could become an important first aspect of the ever-growing world of judicial education.”). But see, e.g., Barbara Applebaum, Remediating Campus Climate: Implicit Bias Training is Not Enough, 38 Stud. Phil. & Educ. 129, 130 (2019) (cautioning against relying on implicit bias training as a panacea and arguing that implicit bias trainings may serve to protect, rather than disrupt and correct, systemic ignorance); Jonathan Kahn, The 911 Covenant: Policing Black Bodies in White Spaces and the Limits of Implicit Bias as a Tool of Racial Justice, 15 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 8–9 (2019) (explaining that implicit bias frameworks, including trainings, marginalize racism); Robert J. Smith, Reducing Racially Disparate Policing Outcomes: Is Implicit Bias Training the Answer?, 37 U. Haw. L. Rev. 295, 303–05 (2015) (describing research showing that reduced bias following implicit bias trainings is likely to be short-lived rather than long-lasting and noting the lack of evidence showing that “reducing implicit bias . . . decrease[s] the incidents of biased behavior”).
 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 88, at 3.
 Rachlinski et al., supra note 116, at 1225–26 (expressing concern that “judges are overconfident about their ability to avoid the influence of race and hence fail to engage in corrective processes on all occasions,” based on a study in which 97 percent of 36 judges surveyed believed they were in the top 50 percent of judges that avoided racial prejudice in the courtroom).
 Nicole E. Negowetti, Judicial Decisionmaking, Empathy, and the Limits of Perception, 47 Akron L. Rev. 693, 704 (2014).
 Pauline T. Kim, Margo Schlanger, Christina L. Boyd & Andrew D. Martin, How Should We Study District Judge Decision-Making?, 29 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol’y 83, 84 (2009).
 Ramirez, supra note 113, at 638–39 (suggesting that “[a] key to influencing judicial involvement and enthusiasm for cultural-competency education is to ensure that those influential district court judges—that is, the connectors, mavens, and salespersons—have the opportunity to experience cognitive training so that they may be convinced of its value and recommend such training to their peers”); see also David Klein & Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and Influence of Individual Judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 J. Leg. Stud. 371, 371 (1999) (creating a model to measure the prestige of federal appellate judges and concluding that higher prestige can translate into an ability to influence other judges).