Copyright © 2021 Steven Arrigg Koh.
 See generally, e.g., W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (1903) (discussing “double consciousness”); Jacques Derrida, Dissemination (Henry Louis Gates, Jr., ed., Barbara Johnson trans., 1981) (discussing hierarchically ordered oppositional categories); Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans., 1952) (examining male subjugation of the female other); Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (Charles Lam Markman trans., 1967) (analyzing the colonially constructed inferiority complex); Edward W. Said, Orientalism (1978) (considering Western perceptions of Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa). See also Kenneth B. Nunn, The Child as Other: Race and Differential Treatment in the Juvenile Justice System, 51 DePaul L. Rev. 679, 690–99 (2002) (reviewing conceptions of “other” and applying them to juvenile justice).
 Nunn, supra note 1, at 698–99; see also, e.g., John Tehranian, WhiteWashed: America’s Middle Eastern Minority 68–72 (2009) (describing the othering and selective racialization of Middle Easterners).
 Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331, 1372 (1988). Social psychology has supported this theory. See Gordon Hodson, Victoria M. Esses & John F. Dovidio, Perceptions of Threat, National Representation, and Support for Procedures To Protect the National Group, in Collateral Damage: The Psychological Consequences of America’s War on Terrorism 109, 109–25 (Paul R. Kimmel & Chris E. Stout eds., 2006).
 Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “The People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 249, 270–71 (2019).
 See generally Shirin Sinnar, Separate and Unequal: The Law of “Domestic” and “International” Terrorism, 117 Mich. L. Rev. 1333 (2019) (challenging the international-domestic terrorism divide and describing its deleterious consequences for Muslims); Tehranian, supra note 2 (describing the assault on the civil rights of Middle Eastern Americans in the wake of 9/11).
 See generally, e.g., Paul Butler, Chokehold: Policing Black Men (2017); Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (2010) (positing that the criminal justice system, through the War on Drugs, has created a contemporary system of discrimination and oppression); James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 21 (2012) (critiquing the Jim Crow analogy); Radley Balko, There’s Overwhelming Evidence that the Criminal Justice System Is Racist. Here’s the Proof, Wash. Post (June 10, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/opinions/systemic-racism-police-evidence-criminal-justice-system [https://perma.cc/KA4N-9LMM] (cataloging studies about racial bias in the criminal justice system); Katherine J. Rosich, Race, Ethnicity, and the Criminal Justice System, Am. Socio. Ass’n (Sept. 2007), https://www.asanet.org/sites/default/files/savvy/images/press/docs/pdf/ASARaceCrime.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TT4-BFRP] (examining complex empirical evidence concerning the effects of race at individual stages of the criminal justice system, and discussing how certain studies find “direct or overt race discrimination in the criminal justice system,” while others indicate “race effects in specific situations, contexts, or jurisdictions—or find no race effects at all”).
 See generally Matiangai Sirleaf, Racing National Security: Introduction to the Just Security Symposium, Just Sec. (July 13, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/71373/racing-national-security-introduction-to-the-just-security-symposium [https://perma.cc/D4XG-5MZX] (rendering race more visible in national security discourse, while also emphasizing racial justice over racial discrimination as an analytical framework).
 See e.g., Susan M. Akram & Maritza Karmely, Immigration and Constitutional Consequences of Post-9/11 Policies Involving Arabs and Muslims in the United States: Is Alienage a Distinction Without a Difference?, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 609, 611–15 (2005) (discussing the targeting of Arab and Muslim citizens and post-9/11 policy impacts); Lenese C. Herbert, Bête Noire: How Race-Based Policing Threatens National Security, 9 Mich. J. Race & L. 149, 156–58 (2003) (arguing that race-based policing threatens national security by sowing distrust); Towards the Closure of Guantanamo, Inter-Am. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/multimedia/guantanamo/guantanamo.html [https://perma.cc/8F25-735B] (describing Guantanamo Bay as a “[d]iscriminatory regime . . . on the basis of [the prisoner’s] nationality, ethnicity, and religion”).
 See generally, e.g., Fatou Bensouda, Africa Question: Is the International Criminal Court (ICC) Targeting Africa Inappropriately?, ICC F. (Mar. 2013), https://iccforum.com/africa [https://perma.cc/XPZ8-SL6J] (debating whether Africa is inappropriately targeted by the ICC); Mary Kimani, Pursuit of Justice or Western Plot?, United Nations: Africa Renewal (Oct. 2009), https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/october-2009/pursuit-justice-or-western-plot [https://perma.cc/KQR7-JCP6] (discussing the controversy concerning the ICC’s role in Africa); Maxine Rubin, Points of Tension Between African States and the International Criminal Court, Soc. Sci. Res. Council (Aug. 27, 2019), https://kujenga-amani.ssrc.org/2019/08/27/points-of-tension-between-african-states-and-the-international-criminal-court [https://perma.cc/L5XN-HVUP] (same); Adam Taylor, Why So Many African Leaders Hate the International Criminal Court, Wash. Post (June 15, 2015, 2:11 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/06/15/why-so-many-african-leaders-hate-the-international-criminal-court [https://perma.cc/9LDP-M2HS] (same).
 See, e.g., Makau Mutua, Critical Race Theory and International Law: The View of an Insider-Outsider, 45 Vill. L. Rev. 841, 845 (2000) (proposing that critical race theory be “deployed as part of the project for the reconstruction of international law”).
 See, e.g., Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 457, 470, 530–33 (2010) (describing measures taken by states to further study the ways in which collateral consequences of criminal conviction disproportionately burden communities of color).
 See generally Sinnar, supra note 5(challenging the international-domestic terrorism divide and describing its deleterious consequences for Muslims).
 See generally Steven Arrigg Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions, 94 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 340 (2019) [hereinafter Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions] (exploring both the promise and risks of foreign affairs prosecutions).
 See generally Steven Arrigg Koh, Core Criminal Procedure, 105 Minn. L. Rev. 251 (2020) (arguing that the U.S. government treats some criminal procedural rights as “marginal and expendable” in the context of foreign affairs prosecutions); Steven Arrigg Koh, The Criminalization of Foreign Relations, 90 Fordham L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021) [hereinafter Koh, Criminalization] (on file with Author).
 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, The U.S. and the ICC: No More Excuses, 12 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 563, 563–68 (2013) (scrutinizing excuses given for the United States’s failure to become party to the ICC’s founding treaty); David J. Scheffer, U.S. Policy and the International Criminal Court, 32 Cornell Int’l L.J. 529, 531–32 (1999) (discussing the U.S. delegation’s objectives during negotiations of the Rome Treaty and its rationale for declining to support the final draft treaty); see also Mileno Sterio, The Trump Administration and the International Criminal Court: A Misguided New Policy, 51 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 201, 203–10 (2019) (criticizing the Trump administration’s policy towards the ICC as “misguided and detrimental to United States’ interests”).
 State Parties to the Rome Statute, Assembly of State Parties, Int’l Crim. Ct., https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx [https://perma.cc/9ACN-FDV9]. This dynamic represents yet another chapter in the long history of U.S. engagement with international criminal tribunals, which oscillates between leadership and hostility. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, International Criminal Justice 5.0, 38 Yale J. Int’l L. 525 (2013) [hereinafter Koh, ICJ 5.0] (reviewing the United States’s role in the history of international criminal justice).
 American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-206, 116 Stat. 899 (2002). The Act severely limits U.S. cooperation with the ICC. See David Scheffer & Ashley Cox, The Constitutionality of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 98 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 983, 991 (2008).
 See Koh, ICJ 5.0, supra note 16, at 534–37 (describing the Obama administration’s efforts to increase engagement with the ICC).
 See Nerida Chazal, Beyond Borders?: The International Criminal Court and the Geopolitics of International Criminal Justice, 22 Griffith L. Rev. 707, 721 (2013); Shai Dothan, Deterring War Crimes, 40 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 739, 744–45 (2015) (explaining that the ICC, as of 2015, had “investigated only eight situations, all of them in African countries”); Alexandra Huneeus, International Criminal Law by Other Means: The Quasi-Criminal Jurisdiction of the Human Rights Courts, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 1, 42 (2013); Mary Kimani, supra note 9; Alexandra Zavis & Robyn Dixon, Q&A: Only Africans Have Been Tried at the Court for the Worst Crimes on Earth, L.A. Times (Oct. 23, 2016, 2:18 PM), https://www.latimes.com/world/africa/la-fg-icc-africa-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/69XX-MTV9].
 Elian Peltier & Fatima Faizi, I.C.C. Allows Afghanistan War Crimes Inquiry To Proceed, Angering U.S., N.Y. Times (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/05/world/europe/afghanistan-war-crimes-icc.html [https://perma.cc/V89F-DYHY].
 See Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions, supra note 13, at 352–58, 388.
 See id. at 346–52.
 Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Accuses Hackers of Trying To Steal Coronavirus Vaccine Data for China, N.Y. Times (July 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/21/us/politics/china-hacking-coronavirus-vaccine.html [https://perma.cc/AL9W-2UYC].
 Alan Feuer, El Chapo Found Guilty on All Counts; Faces Life in Prison, N.Y. Times (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/12/nyregion/el-chapo-verdict.html [https://perma.cc/DZB9-E7DF].
 Matt Apuzzo & Sam Borden, FIFA Charges Instantly Earn Loretta Lynch Global Recognition, N.Y. Times (May 29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/30/sports/soccer/loretta-lynch-with-assist-from-soccer-makes-strong-global-impression.html [https://perma.cc/UKY9-A847]; Evan Perez & Shimon Prokupecz, U.S. Charges 16 FIFA Officials in Widening Probe, CNN (Dec. 3, 2015, 6:02 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/03/sport/fifa-corruption-charges-justice-department/index.html [https://perma.cc/J4CJ-9NLC].
 Allyson Chiu, Trump Has No Qualms About Calling Coronavirus the ‘Chinese Virus.’ That’s a Dangerous Attitude, Experts Say, Wash. Post (Mar. 20, 2020, 7:22 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/03/20/coronavirus-trump-chinese-virus [https://perma.cc/UB5B-QG72].
 Donald Trump Calls Covid-19 ‘Kung Flu’ at Tulsa Rally, Guardian (June 20, 2020, 9:06 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/20/trump-covid-19-kung-flu-racist-language [https://perma.cc/29HT-G78D].
 See, e.g., Chiu, supra note 26; Anna Purna Kambhampaty, ‘I Will Not Stand Silent.’ 10 Asian Americans Reflect on Racism During the Pandemic and the Need for Equality, TIME (June 25, 2020, 6:32 AM), https://time.com/5858649/racism-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/5PLJ-YPB8]; Sabrina Tavernise & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Spit On, Yelled At, Attacked: Chinese-Americans Fear for Their Safety, N.Y. Times (June 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/us/chinese-coronavirus-racist-attacks.html [https://perma.cc/9D23-LEQC]; 8 Dead in Atlanta Spa Shootings, With Fears of Anti-Asian Bias, N.Y. Times (last updated Mar. 26, 2021, 9:19 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/03/17/us/shooting-atlanta-acworth [https://perma.cc/4DWK-BCJY].
 See David E. Sanger & Julian E. Barnes, Is TikTok More of a Parenting Problem Than a Security Threat?, N.Y. Times (Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/07/us/politics/tiktok-security-threat.html [https://perma.cc/6NUR-8N2E]; Andy Blatchford & Leah Nylen, Trump’s Comments About Deal Huawei Exec’s Arrest To Take Center Stage in Extradition Fight, Politico (last updated June 15, 2020, 11:55 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/15/trump-china-trade-deal-huawei-executive-extradition-319642 [https://perma.cc/MUE7-RZPB].
 Duncan Williams & Gideon Yaffe, Trump’s Administration Says the Travel Ban Isn’t Like Japanese Internment. It Is., Wash. Post (May 16, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/05/16/trumps-administration-says-the-travel-ban-isnt-like-japanese-internment-it-is [https://perma.cc/NRK3-T9LG].
 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Information About the Department of Justice’s China Initiative and a Compilation of China-Related Prosecutions Since 2018 (last updated Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/information-about-department-justice-s-china-initiative-and-compilation-china-related [https://perma.cc/G7P2-LC6Z].
 Id. As will be discussed infra, this Essay’s claim is not that all sixty-eight of these cases are wholly motivated by race and thus illegitimate; indeed, U.S. criminal justice must be marshalled to some degree alongside other foreign policy modalities such as diplomacy and sanctions. See Koh, Criminalization supra note 14, at 23–24. However, othering across borders contributes to the decision to investigate and prosecute such cases; the critical and political economic lens described herein provides insight into this dynamic.
 See Barnes, supra note 23.
 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Charges Three Chinese Hackers Who Work at Internet Security Firm for Hacking Three Corporations for Commercial Advantage (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-three-chinese-hackers-who-work-internet-security-firm-hacking-three-corporations [https://perma.cc/77TV-4SDZ].
 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Eight Individuals Charged With Conspiring To Act as Illegal Agents of the People’s Republic of China (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/eight-individuals-charged-conspiring-act-illegal-agents-people-s-republic-china [https://perma.cc/8EPR-JVRT]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Hayward Resident Sentenced to Four Years for Acting as an Agent of the People’s Republic of China (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hayward-resident-sentenced-four-years-acting-agent-people-s-republic-china [https://perma.cc/Y4CZ-AFXT]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, New York City Police Department Officer Charged with Acting as Illegal Agent of the People’s Republic of China (Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/new-york-city-police-department-officer-charged-acting-illegal-agent-people-s-republic-china [https://perma.cc/GF5L-D3U9].
 Laura Silver, Kat Devlin & Christine Huang, Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/10/06/unfavorable-views-of-china-reach-historic-highs-in-many-countries [perma.cc/23TF-DL75].
 While the actions are nominally triggered by the prospect of the investigation and prosecution of U.S. servicemembers, this is not a new issue. The Bush administration, also motivated by this fear, concluded bilateral Article 98 agreements in order to procure immunity of U.S. troops from ICC jurisdiction. Clare M. Ribando, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL33337, Article 98 Agreements and Sanctions on U.S. Foreign Aid to Latin America 2 (2006). In the Trump administration, this same threat triggered a new response: individual sanctions levied against people of color leading the ICC.
 Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji, Int’l Crim. Ct., https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtStructure/Pages/judge.aspx?name=Judge%20Chile%20Eboe-Osuji [https://perma.cc/78S3-RALL].
 See Sterio, supra note 15, at 209; The Trump Administration Revokes the ICC Prosecutor’s U.S. Visa Shortly Before the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber Declines To Authorize an Investigation into War Crimes in Afghanistan, 113 Am. J. Int’l L. 625, 625–30 (2019); Alex Ward, Why the Trump Administration Is Sanctioning a Top International Court, Vox (June 12, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/6/12/21287798/trump-international-criminal-court-sanctions-explained [https://perma.cc/HU65-VY2S] (discussing how the sanctioning of ICC members was in part motivated by a desire to protect U.S. servicemembers and Israel).
 Id. In June 2020, in response to ICC investigations in Afghanistan, the Trump administration announced the imposition of sanctions and visa restrictions against ICC officials as part of an “important first step in holding the ICC accountable for exceeding its mandate and violating the sovereignty of the United States.” Julian Borger, Trump Targets ICC with Sanctions After Court Opens War Crimes Investigation, Guardian (June 11, 2020, 12:37 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/11/trump-icc-us-war-crimes-investigation-sanctions [https://perma.cc/X84U-CULS]. Then Attorney General William Barr also indicated that the DOJ had commenced domestic investigations into executives at the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor for “corruption and malfeasance.” Uzay Yasar Aysev, Can the International Criminal Court Hold the Trump Administration in Contempt?, Just Sec. (July 30, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/71498/can-the-international-criminal-court-hold-the-trump-administration-in-contempt [https://perma.cc/2WNX-NHJ4].
 Julian Borger, US Imposes Sanctions on Top International Criminal Court Officials, Guardian (Sept. 2, 2020, 12:08 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2020/sep/02/us-sanctions-international-criminal-court-fatou-bensouda [https://perma.cc/RU3Y-DF2C].
 Beth Van Schaack, A Test for the US Posture on the Int’l Criminal Court: “Safe Harbor” Licenses?, Just Sec. (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/72305/a-test-for-the-us-posture-on-the-intl-criminal-court-safe-harbor-licenses [https://perma.cc/P5AR-7JAT].
 Daniel Fried, former State Department coordinator for sanctions policy during the Obama administration, criticized the U.S. sanctions for “creat[ing] the reality, not just the impression, of the United States as a unilateralist bully with contempt for international law and norms.” Pranshu Verma, Trump’s Sanctions on International Court May Do Little Beyond Alienating Allies, N.Y. Times (last updated Feb. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/18/world/europe/trump-sanctions-international-criminal-court.html [https://perma.cc/HM45-YFQD]. Additionally, Eric Lorber, a former senior adviser to the undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence in the Trump administration, denounced the U.S. sanctions as yet another example of the administration’s inability to strike a proper balance between “using sanctions in a way that protects national interests while ensuring buy-in from key partners.” Id.
 The top diplomat of the European Union condemned the actions of the United States as “unacceptable and unprecedented.” Id. Germany’s foreign minister also criticized the sanctions, referring to them as a “serious mistake.” Id.
 President O-Gon Kwon of the Assembly of State Parties, which is the legislative body that oversees the ICC’s management, spoke out against the “unprecedented” measures taken by the United States against the international organization. See UN Dismayed Over US Sanctions on Top International Criminal Court Officials, UN News (Sept. 2, 2020), https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/09/1071572 [https://perma.cc/2MQQ-DES7] (reporting that Kwon released a statement that he “deeply regret[ted] measures targeting Court officials, staff and their families”). Additionally, Richard Dicker, who serves as the international justice director of the Human Rights Watch, claimed that the U.S. sanctions were obstructive and perverse, in that they “persecute[d] those tasked with prosecuting international crimes.” Borger, supra note 44. Daniel Balson, advocacy director of the human-rights group Amnesty International USA, expressed concerns that “[t]he White House’s actions may dissuade survivors of human rights abuses from demanding justice, and create a chilling effect on those who would support their efforts.” Ian Talley & Courtney McBride, U.S. Imposes Sanctions on International Criminal Court Officials, Wall St. J. (Sept. 2, 2020, 3:37 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-imposes-sanctions-on-international-criminal-court-officials-11599073486 [https://perma.cc/BG96-YDU4].
 Van Schaack, supra note 45.
 Kent Greenfield, The Puzzle of Short-Termism, 46 Wake Forest L. Rev. 627, 627–28 (2011).
 By “critical theory” I mean the analytical framework of law as politics, and in particular, the ways in which race is constructed by and in American law. Mark V. Tushnet, Critical Legal Theory, in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 80, 88 (William A. Edmundson & Martin P. Golding eds., Blackwell Publishers, 2005). By “political economy” I mean the analytical framework focusing on how public officials and institutions only meet their legal obligations if it is in their (self-)interest to do so. Lewis A. Kornhauser, Economic Rationality in the Analysis of Legal Rules and Institutions, in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, supra at 67, 70.
 As Professor Shirin Sinnar stated,
Sinnar, supra note 5, at 1395.
 See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 509 (2001).
 Adam Serwer, Birtherism of a Nation, Atlantic (May 13, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/birtherism-and-trump/610978 [https://perma.cc/7MGQ-QHL7].
 Dan Roberts, Ben Jacobs & Sabrina Siddiqui, Donald Trump Threatens To Jail Hillary Clinton in Second Presidential Debate, Guardian (Oct. 10, 2016, 11:57 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/oct/10/debate-donald-trump-threatens-to-jail-hillary-clinton [https://perma.cc/7M7R-MBR4].
 Rupert Neate, Donald Trump Doubles Down on Mexico “Rapists” Comments Despite Outrage, Guardian (July 2, 2015, 3:58 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/02/donald-trump-racist-claims-mexico-rapes [https://perma.cc/B73K-UT5P].
 Z. Byron Wolf, Trump’s Attacks on Judge Curiel Are Still Jarring To Read, CNN (Feb. 27, 2018, 8:24 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/27/politics/judge-curiel-trump-border-wall/index.html [https://perma.cc/C9HK-NM4Q].
 See Josh Dawsey, Trump Derides Protections for Immigrants from “Shithole” Countries, Wash. Post (Jan. 12, 2018, 7:52 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-attacks-protections-for-immigrants-from-shithole-countries-in-oval-office-meeting/2018/01/11/bfc0725c-f711-11e7-91af-31ac729add94_story.html [https://perma.cc/H83K-VLHM]; Rupert Neate & Jo Tuckman, Donald Trump: Mexican Migrants Bring “Tremendous Infectious Disease” to US, Guardian (July 6, 2015, 6:29 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/06/donald-trump-mexican-immigrants-tremendous-infectious-disease [https://perma.cc/Z2S6-ND25]; Roberts, Jacobs & Siddiqui, supra note 55.
 Bianca Quilantan & David Cohen, Trump Tells Dem Congresswomen: Go Back Where You Came From, Politico (July 14, 2019, 9:15 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/14/trump-congress-go-back-where-they-came-from-1415692 [https://perma.cc/8NV6-RHZY].
 Jan Ransom, Trump Will Not Apologize for Calling for Death Penalty Over Central Park Five, N.Y. Times (June 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/nyregion/central-park-five-trump.html [https://perma.cc/L49P-ZD6B].
 Adam Goldman & Katie Benner, U.S. Drops Michael Flynn Case, in Move Backed by Trump, N.Y. Times (May 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/07/us/politics/michael-flynn-case-dropped.html [https://perma.cc/Z8TS-ULNX].
 Helene Cooper, Maggie Haberman & Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Trump Says He Intervened in War Crimes Cases To Protect “Warriors,” N.Y. Times (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/25/us/politics/mark-esper-seal-navy-secretary.html [https://perma.cc/9TSL-5PH6]; Dave Philipps, Trump Reverses Navy Decision To Oust Edward Gallagher from SEALs, N.Y. Times (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/21/us/trump-seals-eddie-gallagher.html [https://perma.cc/8XAQ-A49L].
 Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 811, 823 (2017) (“[W]ithin the executive branch, the President’s direct influence is subject to constraints designed to safeguard the fair enforcement of the law.”). Attorney general nominees since Watergate have also endorsed this autonomy principle. Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the President Control the Department of Justice?, 70 Ala. L. Rev. 1, 22 (2018). White House priorities do enter the DOJ when the president installs political appointees to lead USAOs and the Main Justice Criminal Division, but many DOJ institutional priorities persist across administrations. And in any event, once such leadership is installed, the White House does not direct the DOJ on how to proceed in individual cases.
 Former President Barack Obama remarked,
Obama, supra note 63, at 823; see also Green & Roiphe, supra note 63, at 16 (“But, presidents do not, as a general matter, tell the FBI when to initiate or terminate particular investigations. Nor do they direct federal prosecutors whether charges against an individual should be presented to the grand jury or how pending charges should be prosecuted.”).
 For example, as noted above, Trump said he would intervene with Meng, then his administration walked it back. Demetri Sevastopulo & David da Silva, Donald Trump Willing To Intervene in Huawei CFO Arrest Case, Fin. Times (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/f82176a2-fda8-11e8-aebf-99e208d3e521 [https://perma.cc/J53C-LVCS].
 Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions, supra note 13, at 385–86. Indeed, prosecution of Chinese hackers has been ongoing since the Obama administration, which tried to broker a détente in such actions with a diplomatic summit on intellectual property, albeit one that ultimately only slowed, not stopped, such theft. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial Advantages (May 19, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor [https://perma.cc/JJT7-4YRA]; Jack Goldsmith & Robert D. Williams, The Chinese Hacking Indictments and the Frail “Norm” Against Commercial Espionage, Lawfare (Nov. 30, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinese-hacking-indictments-and-frail-norm-against-commercial-espionage [https://perma.cc/8VNB-9NJC].
 Main Justice in DOJ maintains the authority to exclusively prosecute, review, and/or coordinate with USAOs regarding certain offenses, such as capital cases and foreign corrupt practices. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Att’ys’ Manual § 9-10.040 (2020) (“Prior to seeking an indictment for an offense potentially punishable by death, the United States Attorney or Assistant Attorney General shall consult with the Capital Case Section.”); Id. § 9-47.110 (“Unless otherwise agreed upon by the AAG, Criminal Division, investigations and prosecutions of alleged violations of the antibribery provisions of the FCPA will be conducted by Trial Attorneys of the Fraud Section.”).
 Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 369, 406 (2009).
 Stanford L. Sch., DOJ and SEC Enforcement Actions per Year, Foreign Corrupt Pracs. Act Clearinghouse, http://fcpa.stanford.edu/statistics-analytics.html?tab=1 [https://perma.cc/EQ5N-8CQ6] (select “Foreign and Domestic Entities Charged per Year”); Stanford L. Sch., Location of Misconduct Alleged in FCPA-Related Enforcement Actions (by Country), Foreign Corrupt Pracs. Act Clearinghouse, http://fcpa.stanford.edu/statistics-analytics.html?tab=8 [https://perma.cc/B9RT-XW3H].
 Adam Taylor & Liu Yang, An Unlikely Winner in the China-U.S. Trade War? A French Businessman’s Book About His Battle with the DOJ, Wash. Post (June 8, 2019, 4:23 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/06/07/an-unlikely-winner-china-us-trade-war-french-businessmans-book-about-his-battle-with-doj [https://perma.cc/P5TT-PNRA]. The book details how Frédéric Pierucci, the former senior executive of French multinational Alstom SA, was arrested, prosecuted, and incarcerated in the United States for FCPA violations. See generally Frédéric Pierucci, The American Trap: My Battle To Expose America’s Secret Economic War Against the Rest of the World (2019). In Pierucci’s conception, FCPA prosecutions are nothing other than an arm of American power, designed to incapacitate foreign companies competing with U.S. companies. Id.
 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992).
 Id. at 658. The Court held that such action did not contravene the treaty, over a strenuous dissent from Justice John Paul Stevens and widespread global condemnation. See id. at 666, 668–70; id. at 670–71 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions, supra note 13, at 341, 373–74, 388.
 Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1996).
 See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 513 n.9 (2008); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 382–83 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998).
 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. For more information on the ICJ’s interpretation of art. 36, see Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12, 43, 71 (Mar. 31); see also Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), Application of the Republic of Paraguay, ¶¶ 1, 3–4 (Apr. 3, 1998), https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/99/7183.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3DL-GHAQ] ) (petitioning the ICJ to determine whether the United States had failed to comply with its obligations to Angel Breard, a Paraguayan national, and Paraguay under VCCR; however, Paraguay rescinded its case prior to the ICJ issuing a ruling on the matter); LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 472–73, ¶ 11 (June 27) (filing in the ICJ by Germany against the United States, alleging that the United States had failed to notify two German nationals of their right to have German consular officials contacted following their arrests).
 See Steven Arrigg Koh, Note, “Respectful Consideration” After Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon: Why the Supreme Court Owes More to the International Court of Justice, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 243, 250–73 (2007).
 See Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions, supra note 13, at 352–58.
 See Koh, Criminalization, supra note 14, at 5–12 (describing the use of such modalities in the context of the China Initiative).
 See Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions, supra note 13, at 352.
 See id. at 352–55, 359–61.
 See Green & Roiphe, supra note 63, at 64.
 See Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 171, 176–82 (2019); William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 Ohio St. L.J. 1325, 1332–33 (1993).
 See, e.g., Jesse Eisinger, The Chickenshit Club: Why the Justice Department Fails To Prosecute Executives xvii, 31, 87 (2017) (asserting that the shifts in the political landscape, courts, the defense bar, and the DOJ have collectively undermined the power and persistence of U.S. prosecutors to go after corporations and their executives).
 Makau Mutua, Never Again: Questioning the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, 11 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 167, 175–78 (1997).
 See id. at 168 n.3, 176–78.
 The ICC has since suspended activities on this case. Marlise Simons, Sudan: Prosecutor Halts Darfur Inquiry, N.Y. Times (Dec. 12, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/13/world/africa/sudan-prosecutor-halts-darfur-inquiry.html [https://perma.cc/R9QE-3RBA]. However, on June 10, 2020, ICC prosecutor Fatou Bensouda implored the Security Council and the broader international community to urge Sudan to increase its efforts in bringing Darfur war crimes suspects to justice. Press Release, U.N. Sec. Counsel, Securing Justice for Past Crimes in Darfur Must Remain Sudan’s Priority, International Criminal Court Prosecutor Tells Security Council (June 10, 2020), https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14210.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/R7VU-PRNF]. Bensouda’s statements followed the June 3 transfer of Ali Kushayb into ICC custody in the Central African Republic—a promising development in the ICC’s plans to achieve justice for Darfur victims. Id. (“Justice for Darfur has already been too elusive for too long . . . . It is past time for that unsatisfactory state of affairs to change. A window of opportunity has been reopened. We must collectively seize it.”).
 At Five-Year Mark, Darfur Crisis Is Only Worsening – UN Aid Chief, UN News (Apr. 22, 2008), https://news.un.org/en/story/2008/04/256942-five-year-mark-darfur-crisis-only-worsening-un-aid-chief [https://perma.cc/DSP3-L2PJ]. In June 2020, fugitive and former militia leader Ali Kosheib turned himself in to the ICC, thus becoming the first individual to likely be tried by the Court. Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., Situation in Darfur (Sudan): Ali Kushayb is in ICC Custody (June 9, 2020), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=PR1525 [https://perma.cc/P8UW-2GR4]; ICC: Sudanese Fugitive in Custody: Ali Kosheib First Suspect Held for Government-Backed Crimes in Darfur, Hum. Rts. Watch (June 9, 2020), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/09/icc-sudanese-fugitive-custody [https://perma.cc/42J7-WJQ2]. It is a welcome development: by any measure, this is indeed a “crime of most serious concern to the international community” and thus a call to the promotion of criminal accountability. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
 See Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions, supra note 13, at 362–85.
 Karen Freifeld & Yann Le Guernigou, Obama Deflects French Pressure To Intervene in BNP Dispute, Reuters (June 5, 2014, 6:10 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bnpparibas-usa/obama-deflects-french-pressure-to-intervene-in-bnp-dispute-idUSKBN0EG15420140605 [https://perma.cc/MDA6-PU77]. At a dinner between Presidents Obama and Hollande, Obama rejected Hollande’s request to intervene in the DOJ investigation of the French bank. Id. He is reported to have stated something to the effect of “[t]he tradition of the United States is that the president does not meddle in prosecutions.” Id.
 See Clair Apodaca, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy Tool, in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis *2 (Apr. 26, 2017), https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-332 [https://perma.cc/RG8D-J6SY].
 See Koh, Criminalization, supra note 14, at 17; see also Steven Arrigg Koh, Criminalizing Foreign Relations: How the Biden Administration Can Prevent a Global Arrest Game, Just Sec. (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/73853/criminalizing-foreign-relations-how-the-biden-administration-can-prevent-a-global-arrest-game [https://perma.cc/7Y8J-NHC4]. In the case of FCPA prosecutions, for example, aggressive U.S. enforcement has led to a rise in such enforcement practices in France. See generally Frederick Davis, Where Are We Today in The International Fight Against Overseas Corruption: An Historical Perspective, And Two Problems Going Forward, 23 ILSA J. Int’l & Compar. L. 337 (2017) (discussing French legislative efforts to address overseas bribery).
 Kate O’Keeffe & Aruna Viswanatha, China Warns U.S. It May Detain Americans in Response to Prosecutions of Chinese Scholars, Wall St. J. (Oct. 17, 2020, 3:37 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-warns-u-s-it-may-detain-americans-in-response-to-prosecutions-of-chinese-scholars-11602960959 [https://perma.cc/E9X7-9JLX].
 See e.g., Tehranian, supra note 2, at 165 (listing a wide variety of reforms in law, media, and culture to redress civil rights violations against Middle Easterners).
 Koh, ICJ 5.0, supra note 16, at 534–37.
 While this addresses U.S. interference with ICC function, it also compounds the geopolitical dynamics surrounding the ICC: more powerful countries may evade prosecution when engaged in a positive interrelationship with the Court.
 Beth Van Schaack, The Int’l Criminal Court Executive Order: Global Reactions Compiled, Just Sec. (Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/72256/the-intl-criminal-court-executive-order-global-reactions-compiled [https://perma.cc/P7WY-6J6N].
 This happened, analogously, in the ICC’s inquiry into war crimes perpetrated by the British in Iraq between 2003 and 2008. See Owen Bowcott, ICC Abandons Inquiry Into Alleged British War Crimes in Iraq, Guardian (Dec. 9, 2020, 12:44 PM) (quoting Office of the Prosecutor, Statement of the Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the Conclusion of the Preliminary Examination of the Situation in Iraq/United Kingdom, Int’l Crim. Ct. (Dec. 9, 2020) https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=201209-otp-statement-iraq-uk [https://perma.cc/E2LS-K3U9]), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/dec/09/icc-abandons-inquiry-into-alleged-british-war-crimes-in-iraq [https://perma.cc/6Y5S-M6FC] (“[T]he office . . . could not substantiate allegations that the UK investigative and prosecutorial bodies had engaged in shielding . . . , based on a careful scrutiny of the information before it.”).
 Nahal Toosi, Biden Lifts Sanctions on International Criminal Court Officials, Politico (Apr. 2, 2021, 4:10 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/04/02/icc-sanctions-reversed-biden-478731 [https://perma.cc/EW68-2AV9].
 See Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions, supra note 13, at 391–92; Steven Arrigg Koh, Julian Assange and Omar al-Bashir: What Comes Next for Two Global Fugitives?, Just Sec. (Apr. 12, 2019) [hereinafter Koh, What Comes Next], https://www.justsecurity.org/63620/julian-assange-and-omar-al-bashir-what-comes-next-for-two-global-fugitives [https://perma.cc/99CZ-NL7N].
 See, e.g., Koh, What Comes Next, supra note 99 (describing the geopolitical implications of the case for the extradition of Julian Assange).
 For some countries, this is easier said than done, given that some countries lack sufficient rule of law to warrant conclusion of extradition or mutual legal assistance treaties. See generally Koh, Criminalization, supra note 14. But the United States may still broker smaller, more surgical, deals using executive agreements. See Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 Yale L.J. 1236, 1307–12 (2002) (discussing structural obstacles to Article II treatymaking); Kathleen Claussen, Trade Executive Agreements (Mar. 24, 2021) (in progress manuscript) (on file with author); Guillermo J. Garcia Sanchez, The Other Secret Deals with Mexico and the Expansion of the Executive Bureaucracies (Feb. 17, 2021) (in progress manuscript) (on file with author).
 See Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions, supra note 13, at 358–59 (discussing mutual legal assistance treaties); Koh, Core Criminal Procedure, supra note 14, at 269–70 (reviewing recent developments in exchange of electronic evidence). Of course, challenges exist to negotiation and enforcement of such agreements: at times countries fail to reach consensus on terms, while violations of the agreements may not be adequately redressed. And yet the prospect of mutual benefit—for example, the promise of obtaining evidence from a foreign jurisdiction for use in a domestic prosecution—around criminal prosecution gives countries incentive for continued engagement in law enforcement relationships. This, to some degree, explains the rise of bilateral and multilateral law enforcement agreements in recent decades. Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions, supra note 13, at 358–59 (reviewing the rise of transnational criminal legal treatymaking).
 See Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions, supra note 13, at 355–56 (comparing the efficacy of international tribunals against foreign affairs prosecutions); Mattia Cacciatori, When Kings Are Criminals: Lessons from ICC Prosecutions of African Presidents, 12 In’tl J. Transitional Just. 386, 386–89 (2018) (reviewing the dynamics between the ICC, NGOs, and the governments of Sudan and Kenya).
 See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Searching for Solutions To the Indigent Defense Crisis in the Broader Criminal Justice Reform Agenda, 122 Yale L.J. 2316, 2316 (2013) (arguing that indigent defense reform should be incorporated into “smart-on-crime” initiatives); Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Reclaiming Equality to Reframe Indigent Defense Reform, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 1197, 1200–01 (2013) (arguing that indigent defense reform should be based on the broader concept of access to justice and not just the right to counsel); Jonathan A. Rapping, You Can’t Build on Shaky Ground: Laying the Foundation for Indigent Defense Reform Through Values-Based Recruitment, Training, and Mentoring, 3 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 161, 161–64 (2009) (arguing for the necessity of a cultural shift to help improve indigent defense).
 See generally, e.g., Mirko Bagaric, Julie Clarke & William Rininger, Plea Bargaining: From Patent Unfairness to Transparent Justice, 84 Mo. L. Rev. 1 (2019) (noting plea bargains are unnecessarily harsh due to the built-in power disparities); Carlos Berdejó, Criminalizing Race: Racial Disparities in Plea-Bargaining, 59 B.C. L. Rev. 1187 (2018) (arguing that a defendant’s race plays a factor in plea bargaining); see also H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of the Justice System, 61 Cath. U. L. Rev. 63, 66 (2012) (noting that overcharging in the plea-bargaining process “runs afoul of the ethical guidelines governing prosecutors, abuses its prosecutorial power, and compromises the justice system as a whole”); Ralph Adam Fine, Plea Bargaining: An Unnecessary Evil, 70 Marq. L. Rev. 615, 615 (1987) (arguing that plea bargaining encourages crime and “extort[s] guilty pleas from the innocent”).
 See, e.g., Thomas Ward Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 1593, 1593, 1595–96 (2018) (arguing that “black and white jurors regularly c[o]me to starkly different conclusions about guilt and innocence”); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1611, 1611 (1985) (arguing that research “reveals a widespread tendency among whites to convict black defendants in instances in which white defendants would be acquitted”); Robert C. Walters, Michael D. Marin & Mark Curriden, Jury of Our Peers: An Unfulfilled Constitutional Promise, 58 SMU L. Rev. 319, 319–20 (2005) (finding that two of Texas’s largest counties—Dallas and Harris—were not populating representative juries for trials).