† Anne Fleming Research Professor & Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This Article is based in part on Congressional testimony before the House Financial Services Committee and House Small Business Committee on rent-a-banks and on an amicus brief submitted in rent-a-bank litigation. This Article is a companion piece to Adam J. Levitin, Rent-a-Bank: Bank Partnerships and the Evasion of Usury Laws, 71 Duke L.J. 329 (2021).
 See Kaur v. World Bus. Lenders, LLC, 440 F. Supp. 3d 111, 121 (D. Mass. 2020) (explaining the supposed doctrine as “if the interest rate in the original loan agreement was non-usurious, the loan cannot become usurious upon assignment—so, the assignee lawfully may charge interest at the original rate” (quoting In re Rent-Rite Superkegs W., Ltd. v. World Bus. Lenders, LLC (In re Rent-Rite Superkegs W., Ltd.), 603 B.R. 41, 66 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019), rev’d in part, 623 B.R. 335 (D. Colo. 2020))).
 See, e.g., Amicus Brief of the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. and Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency in Support of Affirmance and Appellee at 10, In re Rent-Rite Superkegs W., Ltd., (No. 19-cv-1552) [hereinafter “FDIC/OCC Amicus Brief”] (quoting Nichols v. Fearson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 103, 109 (1833)). It is also worth noting that the “valid when made” doctrine is a federal common law. This would seem to create a problem for the doctrine. The Supreme Court made clear in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) that federal courts lack a judicial power to create general federal common law regarding state law claims when sitting in diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 78. Usury claims are state law claims, so to the extent that jurisdiction exists based on diversity, there is no basis for federal courts extending a common law rule. Jurisdiction might be federal question jurisdiction based on section 85 of the National Bank Act of 1864 (NBA), 12 U.S.C. § 85, and section 1831d of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA), 12 U.S.C. § 1831d, but neither statute can support as broad of a doctrine as valid-when-made. Instead, any federal common law under either statute would have to be confined to the scope of the statute.
 Adam J. Levitin, Rent-a-Bank: Bank Partnerships and the Evasion of Usury Laws, 71 Duke L.J. 329, 332 (2021).
 See id. at 333, 338.
 Whether the bank has skin-in-the-game on the performance of the loan (and to what extent) is transaction specific. In rent-a-bank transactions, banks have very little skin-in-the-game. See id. at 372–73, 385 (giving illustrations of the extent of retained bank interest in rent-a-bank originated loans.) Securitization transactions, however, can vary substantially by asset type. See Adam J. Levitin, Skin-in-the-Game: Risk Retention Lessons from Credit Card Securitization, 81 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 813, 816, 818, 847–850 (2013) (contrasting formal contractual risk retention and implicit recourse in credit card securitizations).
 In particular, bank regulation includes “soft” supervision and moral suasion that is generally effective at dissuading banks from offering products of which regulators disapprove, irrespective of the presence of statutory prohibitions. See Levitin, supra note 3, at 358.
 Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85 Fed. Reg. 33,530, 33,532 (June 2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 & 160) (codifying OCC valid-when-made rule)); Federal Interest Rate Authority, 85 Fed. Reg. 44,146, 44,149 (July 22, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 331) (codifying FDIC valid-when-made rules).
 Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85 Fed. Reg. at 33,532. Congress is presumed to legislate against the backdrop of the common law. E.g., Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2286 (2016) (“[W]e presume that Congress legislates against the backdrop of the common law.”); Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991). Accordingly, “[s]tatutes which invade the common law . . . are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.” Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952). In such cases, “to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must ‘speak directly’ to the question addressed by the common law.” United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has instructed courts to follow “[t]he canon of construction that statutes should be interpreted consistently with the common law [to] interpret a statute that clearly covers a field formerly governed by the common law.” Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 320 (2010).
 Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 301 (1978). The interest rate exportation provision is often incorrectly referred to in shorthand as preemption of state usury laws, but it is in fact a choice of law provision. Levitin, supra note 3, at 350.
 Federal Interest Rate Authority, 85 Fed. Reg. at 44,149; Federal Interest Rate Authority, 84 Fed. Reg. 66,845, 66,848 (proposed Dec. 6, 2019) (to be codified at 12 CFR pt. 331). But see Statement by FDIC Chairman Jelena McWilliams on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Federal Interest Rate Authority (Nov. 19, 2019), https://bit.ly/3gCyeIM [https://perma.cc/W5P3-TN3W] (stating that the FDIC’s rule is “reaffirming and codifying in regulation the valid-when-made doctrine”).
 12 U.S.C. § 1831d.
 See Greenwood Tr. Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 827 (1st Cir. 1992); Federal Interest Rate Authority, 85 Fed. Reg. at 44,147; FDIC/OCC Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 5–6.
 Complaint at 5–6, California v. Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, No. 20-cv-5200 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2020); Complaint at 4–6, California v. FDIC, No. 20-cv-5860 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2020). While this Article was in late stage editing, the district court granted summary judgment for the OCC and FDIC in these cases respectively and denied it to the various state attorneys general. It is unclear if the decision will be appealed. Order Resolving Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, California v. Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, No. 20-cv-5200 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2022)); Order Resolving Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, California v. FDIC, No. 20-cv-5860 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2022)).
 Levitin, supra note 3, at 406.
 Id. at 406–07.
 Id. at 407.
 Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015).
 See John Hannon, Note, The True Lender Doctrine: Function Over Form as a Reasonable Constraint on the Exportation of Interest Rates, 67 Duke L.J. 1261, 1263, 1278–79 (2018) (agreeing with, and even extolling, the historicity of valid-when-made); Lenore Palladino, Small Business Fintech Lending: The Need for Comprehensive Regulation, 24 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 77, 97 n.127 (2018) (agreeing, in a footnote, with the historicity of the valid-when-made doctrine); Piotr Danisewicz & Ilaf Elard, The Real Effects of Financial Technology: Marketplace Lending and Personal Bankruptcy 2, 7–8 (May 15, 2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3208908 [https://perma.cc/7SH9-AEJL] (accepting the historicity of the valid-when-made doctrine alongside an empirical study on the impact of the Madden decision credit availability and bankruptcy filings); Daniel Kaplan, Note, Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015): The Second Circuit Threatens To Disrupt Capital Markets, 8 Neb. L. Rev. Bull. 1, 5–8 (2017) (agreeing with the historicity of valid-when-made); Colleen Honigsberg, Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Richard Squire, How Does Legal Enforceability Affect Consumer Lending? Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 60 J.L. & Econ. 673, 674–76 (2017) (conducting an empirical study on the impact of the Madden decision on credit availability); Brian Knight, Federalism and Federalization on the Fintech Frontier, 20 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 129, 145, 147–48 (2017) (agreeing with the historicity of the valid-when-made doctrine, describing it as “one of ‘two cardinal rules in the doctrine of usury’” (quoting Nichols v. Fearson 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 103, 109 (1833))); Charles M. Horn & Melissa R. H. Hall, The Curious Case of Madden v. Midland Funding and the Survival of the Valid-When-Made Doctrine, 21 N.C. Banking Inst. 1, 6–7, 24 (2017) (accepting of the historicity of valid-when-made, describing it as a valid and dependable legal principle for loan origination, sales, and securitization markets); Angel Rzeslawski, Note, The National Bank Act and the Demise of State Consumer Laws, 68 Hastings L.J. 1421, 1436–37 (2017) (accepting the valid-when-made doctrine while suggesting that other circuits follow the Second Circuit’s lead in Madden); Andrew Silvia, Note, Madden v. Midland Funding LLC: Uprooting the National Bank Act’s Power of Preemption, 92 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 653, 653–54, 658–60 (2017) (agreeing with, and extolling, the historicity of valid-when-made as a cardinal rule of usury law); Zachary Adams Mason, Note, Online Loans Across State Lines: Protecting Peer-to-Peer Lending Through the Exportation Doctrine, 105 Geo. L.J. 217, 242 (2016) (accepting with the historicity of valid-when-made); Michael Marvin, Note, Interest Exportation and Preemption: Madden’s Impact on National Banks, the Secondary Credit Market, and P2P Lending, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 1807, 1832–35 (2016) (claiming that Madden ignores Supreme Court precedent on valid-when-made); Kevin Petrasic, Helen Lee & Katherine Lamberth, Solicitor General in Madden Supports, But Fails To Ensure, the Application of Federal Preemption Doctrine to the Secondary Loan Market and Fate of “Valid-When-Made” Principle, J. Tax’n & Regul. Fin. Insts., May-June 2016, at 41, 42 (agreeing with the historicity of valid-when-made, describing it as “well-established”); Kirby M. Smith, Banking on Preemption: Allowing National Bank Act Preemption for Third-Party Sales, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1631, 1669–71 (2016) (accepting valid-when-made as a historical doctrine, but stating that context makes older cases merely persuasive, not binding). None of these works make any attempt to distinguish between possible sources of bank liquidity in the nineteenth century and contemporary sources of bank liquidity.
 See Christopher K. Odinet, Securitizing Digital Debts, 52 Ariz. St. L.J. 477, 532 & n.356 (2020) (agreeing with the historicity and “vital importan[ce]” of valid-when-made for fintech companies); Abbye Atkinson, Rethinking Credit as Social Provision, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 1093, 1115 n.114, 1119 (2019) (taking a neutral position on the historicity of the valid-when-made doctrine while noting the detrimental effects it can have on low-income consumer loan customers); Jayne Munger, Note, Crossing State Lines: The Trojan Horse Invasion of Rent-a-Bank and Rent-a-Tribe Schemes in Modern Usury Law, 87 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 468, 488 & n.132 (2019) (disagreeing with the acceptance and application of the valid-when-made doctrine as expressed by Madden); Christopher Baiamonte, Note, Stopping Third-Party Debt Buyers from Using National Bank Act Preemption To Dodge State Usury Laws, 69 Syracuse L. Rev. 127, 149–52 (2019) (questioning relevance of valid-when-made because of transactional dissimilarities and the Erie doctrine disavowing general federal common law).
 Examining Opportunities and Challenges in the Financial Technology (“Fintech”) Marketplace Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 115th Cong. 7–8, 10–12 (2018) (written testimony of Adam J. Levitin, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center), https://bit.ly/38eYdBI [https://perma.cc/8DJ6-4SY9].
 Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief of Professor Adam J. Levitin in Support of Appellant at 4–5, Rent-Rite Superkegs W., Ltd. v. World Bus. Lenders, LLC (In re Rent-Rite Superkegs W., Ltd.), 623 B.R. 335 (D. Colo. 2020), No. 1:19-cv-1552. The district court noted it was “convinced” the position advocated by this amicus brief in its Order on Bankruptcy Court’s Determination but nevertheless applied the OCC’s rule. In re: Rent-Rite Superkegs W. Ltd., 623 B.R. at 340–41. See also Kaur v. World Bus. Lenders, LLC, 440 F. Supp. 3d 111, 121 (D. Mass. 2020) (citing the Levitin amicus brief submitted in In re Rent-Rite Superkegs W., Ltd.).
 Adam J. Levitin, “Madden Fix” Bills Are a Recipe for Predatory Lending, Am. Banker (Aug. 28, 2017, 10:24 AM), https://bit.ly/3b7PRh2 [https://perma.cc/4KHP-D7RR].
 See, e.g., FDIC/OCC Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 10.
 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, Midland Funding, LLC v. Madden, 136 S. Ct. 2505 (2016) (No. 15-610) (jointly filed by the Solicitor General and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency). The Solicitor General opposed a grant of certiorari on the grounds that the case was not a good vehicle, but still held that it was wrongly decided. Id. at 13, 17.
 FDIC/OCC Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 10–13; Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85 Fed. Reg. 33,530, 33,532 (June 2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 & 160); Federal Interest Rate Authority, 85 Fed. Reg. 44,146, 44,149 (July 22, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 331).
 See, e.g., OCC Proposes a Rule To Establish When a Bank Is the “True Lender” of a Loan, Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP (July 24, 2020), https://bit.ly/3b229aG [https://perma.cc/9AZP-272F] (“For centuries—predating the enactment of the NBA in 1864—caselaw and market practice had established that an interest rate valid at the origination of the loan remained valid even after the originator (whether or not a bank) sold or assigned the loan to another party (whether or not a bank).”); Randall D. Guynn, Jai R. Massari & Margaret E. Tahyar, Davis Polk & Wardwell, LLP, Federal Banking Regulators Can and Should Resolve Madden and True Lender Developments 1 (Aug. 14, 2018), https://bit.ly/3n7cSD6 [https://perma.cc/A2PF-FQG2] (“A long-settled legal principle known as the ‘valid-when-made’ doctrine has served for almost two centuries as the bedrock for bank lending.”).
 See, e.g., Marketplace Lenders Ass’n, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Entitled “Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred” (undated), https://bit.ly/2Lfwfwu [https://perma.cc/BJC5-9BDY]; Structured Fin. Ass’n & Bank Pol’y Inst., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Entitled “Federal Interest Rate Authority,” (Feb. 4, 2020), https://bit.ly/2XmDbed [https://perma.cc/KL4W-3322] (noting “centuries-old fundamental market expectations” based on the valid-when-made doctrine).
 Rent-Rite Superkegs W., Ltd. v. World Bus. Lenders, LLC (In re Rent-Rite Superkegs W., Ltd.), 603 B.R. 41, 66 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019), rev’d in part, 623 B.R. 335 (D. Colo. 2020).
 See supra note 18.
 The valid-when-made doctrine does not challenge the validity of usury laws directly. Instead, it merely enables an indirect evasion of them, suggesting that the doctrine’s proponents are ultimately instrumental, not principled, in their support of the doctrine.
 James Avery Webb, A Treatise on the Law of Usury, and Incidentally, of Interest § 256 (1899). There was an exception if the contract specified that performance was to occur in another state, which case the law of the state of performance (lex loci solutionis) would control, subject to an anti-evasion principle. Id. §§ 256, 261, 265; Miller v. Tiffany, 68 U.S. 298, 308 (1864).
 See In re Rent-Rite Superkegs W., Ltd., 603 B.R. at 66.
 See infra Part III.
 Strike v. Trans-West Discount Corp., 155 Cal. Rptr. 132, 139 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
 See infra Part I.D.
 See infra Part I.D.
 One such case is Munn v. Commission Co, 15 Johns. 44, 55 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818), where the New York Supreme Court of Judicature noted that:
Id. See also Taylor v. Bruce, 21 Va. 42, 90 (1820) (“[I]t is settled, that a bill or note which is free from usury, in its concoction, may be sold at an usurious discount, for that as it was free from usury between the original parties, no after transaction can, as to these parties, invalidate it . . . .”); Tuttle v. Clark, 4 Conn. 153, 157 (1822) (stating that because “the note was not usurious in its original concoction, or made with an usurious intent,” a discounted sale did not invalidate it); Knights v. Putnam, 20 Mass. 184, 185 (1825) (“[A] note, valid in its inception, may be recovered against the maker, by an indorsee, although discounted by him at a rate exceeding legal interest. It is a well established principle, that if a note or security is valid when made, no usurious transaction afterwards between the parties or privies will affect its validity.” (footnote omitted)); Cram v. Hendricks, 7 Wend. 569, 572 (N.Y. 1831) (“The principle is too well settled to be questioned, that a bill free from usury in its concoction may be sold at a discount; because, as it was free from usury between the original parties to it, no subsequent transaction with another person can, as it respects those parties, invalidate it.”).
 Nat’l Bank v. Johnson, 104 U.S. 271, 276–77 (1881); Evans v. Nat’l Bank of Savannah, 251 U.S. 108, 114 (1919). Section 85 of the National Bank Act covers not only interest on loans, but also interest on discounts. 12 U.S.C. § 85; See also Daniel v. First Nat’l Bank of Birmingham, 227 F.2d 353, 355–56 (5th Cir. 1955) (addressing whether a discount was usurious), reh’g denied with opinion, 228 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1956). The idea of a discount being treated as imputed interest is still regularly applied today in the tax and bankruptcy law, where “original issue discount” on bonds is treated as imputed interest. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.61-7(c); LTV Corp. v. Valley Fidelity Bank & Tr. Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 961 F.2d 378, 380 (2d Cir. 1992); Tex. Com. Bank v. Licht (In re Pengo Indus. Inc.), 962 F.2d 543, 546 (5th Cir. 1992). Under tax and bankruptcy law, secondary market discounts are not treated as imputed interest, however, only discounts at issuance.
 Gaither v. Farmers & Mechs. Bank of Georgetown, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 37 (1828).
 Nichols v. Fearson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 103 (1833).
 Gaither, 26 U.S. at 41–42.
 Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
 Nichols, 32 U.S. at 105.
 Id. at 107. Cf. U.C.C. § 3-415(a) (modern statutory analog).
 Nichols, 32 U.S. at 105–06.
 Id. at 110, 112.
 Id. at 109 (emphasis added). See also id. at 106 (“[T]he rule of law is every where [sic] acknowledged, that a contract, free from usury in its inception, shall not be invalidated by any subsequent usurious transactions upon it.” (emphasis added)).
 See infra Part I.D.
 See infra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.
 See, e.g., Tate v. Wellings (1790) 100 Eng. Rep. 716, 721 (opinion of Buller, J.) (discussing the effect on the usury calculation of a loan of stock that was repayable in stock or cash at the borrower’s option); Unity Plan Fin. Co. v. Green, 155 So. 900, 905 (La. 1934) (noting the effect on the calculation of the interest from the acceleration of a debt that the debtor had failed to repay on time); FDIC v. Tito Castro Constr., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 1224, 1227 (D.P.R. 1982) (“[I]t was only as a consequence of defendant’s election to delay in repaying the principal amount of those [demand] notes that an effective rate of interest in excess of the Puerto Rico statutory ceiling may have resulted.”); Rangen, Inc. v. Valley Trout Farms, Inc., 658 P.2d 955, 959 (Idaho 1983) (discussing the effect on usury calculation of a fee for late payment option); Sw. Concrete Prods. v. Gosh Constr. Corp., 798 P.2d 1247, 1252 (Cal. 1990) (“[A] transaction that was not usurious at its inception cannot become usurious by virtue the debtor’s voluntary default.”); Zang v. Schumann, 55 N.W.2d 864, 867–69 (Wis. 1952) (stating that a borrower’s exercise of an option to pay an extra premium to be relieved from a lease was not to be considered in the calculation of the interest rate); Saul v. Midlantic Nat’l Bank/South, 572 A.2d 650, 658 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (discussing whether the value of a non-optional discounted stock sale accompanying the loan should be included in the interest for the loan); Hoffman v. Key Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 416 A.2d 1265, 1269 (Md. 1979) (discussing whether an optional prepayment should affect the calculation of the interest rate).
 Hoffman v. Key Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 416 A.2d 1265 (Md. 1979).
 Id. at 1267–69.
 Id. at 1269.
 Watkins v. Taylor, 16 Va. (2 Munf.) 424, 436, 438–40 (Va. 1811) (Coalter, J. dissenting) (effect of payment by surety on surety’s subrogation claim on usurious contract); Highway Equip. & Supply Co. v. Jones, 153 N.W.2d 859, 863 (Neb. 1967) (addressing whether usury in the initial transaction was purged by an assignment); Coral Gables First Nat’l Bank v. Constructors of Fla., Inc., 119 So. 2d 741, 746 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (addressing the effect of renewal of a usurious loan on non-usurious terms); Waggener v. Holt Chew Motor Co., 274 P.2d 968, 971 (Colo. 1954) (en banc) (addressing whether a lender’s acquisition of a required license after making loan at rate above that allowed for unlicensed lenders cured the usury violation).
 Coral Gables First Nat’l Bank v. Constructors of Fla., Inc., 119 So. 2d 741 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960)
 Id. at 746.
 To be sure, proponents of the doctrine cite to language from an 1838 edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England for support: “‘[t]he usury must be part of the contract in its inception’ for a contract to be deemed usurious.” FDIC/OCC Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 10 (citing 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 379 n.32 (18th London ed., W.E. Dean 1838)). But the quoted language does not appear in Blackstone’s original treatise. Instead, it is from a later annotator’s footnote. Nor does it actually provide much support the “valid-when-made” doctrine. The footnote cites two English cases. Blackstone, supra. The first, Lowes v. Mazzaredo (1816) 171 Eng. Rep. 505, 505, 1 Stark. 385, 386, dealt with usurious discounting of a non-usurious bill of exchange, which was held not to affect the validity of the bill of exchange. Mazzaredo is squarely within the discounted assignment pattern (pattern 1). The second case, Lowe v. Waller (1781) 99 Eng. Rep. 470, 470–71, 2 Dougl. 736, 736–38, dealt with whether a good faith assignee of a usurious bill of exchange is subject to the defense of usury (pattern 3). This case fits neatly in the cleansing assignment pattern. Both cases are uninformative about the “valid-when-made” doctrine.
 Joseph Chitty, A Practical Treatise on Bills of Exchange, Checks on Bankers, Promissory Notes, Bankers’ Cash Notes, and Bank Notes *105 (5th ed. 1821) (“In general, a subsequent illegal contract or consideration of any description, taking place in a second indorsement or transfer of a bill, and not in its inception, nor in a transfer through which the holder must make title, will not invalidate the same, in the hands of a bona fide holder.” (emphasis in original)). See also Robert Buckley Comyn, A Treatise on the Law of Usury 187 (1817) (“As a security or contract which is usurious in its inception must always retain its unsoundness; so on the other hand, where the security or contract has been originally valid, no subsequent taking of, or contract to take, illegal interest will invalidate it; although by such taking the party absolutely incur the penalty of the statute.”); James Avery Webb, supra note 31, at § 306 (“A contract, free from usury at its execution, cannot be rendered invalid by any subsequent usurious agreement between the same or other persons. A subsequent agreement may be usurious in itself and thereby become either wholly or partly nugatory; but its fate cannot be visited upon the original valid contract.”).
 Strike v. Trans-West Disc. Corp., 155 Cal. Rptr. 132 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
 Id. at 139.
 Id. The California Court of Appeals cited to Calimpco, Inc. v. Warden, 224 P.2d 421 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950), which noted that
Id. at 433. See also Miller v. Tiffany, 68 U.S. 298, 310 (1864) (noting that contractual choice of law provisions for usury are enforceable, but when done with intent to evade the law, law of the contract location applies).
 See Munoz v. Pipestone Fin., LLC, 513 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1078–79 (D. Minn. 2007); Olvera v. Blitt & Gaines, P.C., 431 F.3d 285, 287–89 (7th Cir. 2005); Phipps v. FDIC, 417 F.3d 1006, 1013–14 (8th Cir. 2005); Krispin v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 218 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2000).
 FDIC v. Lattimore Land Corp., 656 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981).
 The exception is Olvera v. Blitt & Gaines, P.C., 431 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 2005). See infra Part II.
 Lattimore Land Corp., 656 F.2d at 148–49.
 Lattimore also made clear that its analysis would have been different if there had been an allegation that the assignee was the true lender. Id. at 148 n.15 (“The present case differs from Daniels in that here the obligors assumed that the allegedly usurious instrument called for non-usurious interest when held by the initial obligee and the obligors have never claimed that Hamilton National Bank was the lender in fact.”).
 Id. at 148–49.
 Id. at 149 n.17 (citation omitted).
 Huntsman v. Longwell, 4 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1925).
 Id. at 106.
 Id. The issue before the court in Huntsman was related to the admissibility of evidence regarding the second contract. Id.
 Id. (citing Nichols v. Fearson, 32 U.S. [7 Pet.] 103 (1833)).
 Id. (citing Nichols, 32 U.S. 103).
 Nichols, 32 U.S. at 109 (emphasis added).
 Munoz v. Pipestone Fin., LLC, 513 F. Supp. 2d 1076 (D. Minn. 2007).
 Id. at 1078.
 Phipps v. FDIC, 417 F.3d 1006 (8th Cir. 2005).
 Munoz, 513 F.3d at 1079 (alteration in original) (quoting Phipps, 417 F.3d at 1013).
 Phipps, 417 F.3d at 1009, 1013.
 Id. at 1013 (quoting Krispin v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 218 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2000)).
 The credit card accounts in question had originally been opened with the nonbank department store, which subsequently assigned the accounts to its national bank affiliate, which then assigned on a daily basis any receivables that were created on the accounts to the department store. Matheis v. May Dep’t Stores Co., No. 4:98-cv-01722, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21917, at *2–4 (E.D. Mo. May 21, 1999), rev’d and remanded sub. nom Krispin v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 218 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2000). The plaintiffs were only alleging usury violations for late fees that arose subsequent to their accounts being assigned to the national bank, id. at *2–3, so the fact that the accounts were originally opened with the nonbank department store had little legal bearing on the usury issue but gets elided in the Eighth Circuit’s opinion. See Krispin, 218 F.3d at 923.
 Krispin, 218 F.3d at 923.
 Matheis, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21917, at *2-3.
 Krispin, 218 F.3d at 924.
 Id. (citing FDIC v. Lattimore Land Corp., 656 F.2d 139, 147–49 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981)).
 Olvera v. Blitt & Gaines, P.C., 431 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 2005) (Posner, J.).
 Id. at 288–89.
 FDIC/OCC Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 14–16; Federal Interest Rate Authority, 84 Fed. Reg. 66,845, 66,848 (proposed Dec. 6, 2019) (to be codified at 12 CFR pt. 331).
 See Restatement (2d) of Contracts § 317(2) (Am. L. Inst. 1981) (“A contractual right can be assigned . . . .” (emphasis added)); 29 Williston on Contracts § 74:10 (4th ed.) (“Generally, all contract rights may be assigned . . . .” (emphasis added)).
 Were it otherwise, then credit unions would be able to sell tax-exempt status to everyone merely by selling off a small piece of a loan.
 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 85, 1831d.
 See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, H.R. 4986, 96th Cong. § 525 (1980) (providing that the effective period for the provisions terminates when a state adopts a provision “which states explicitly and by its terms that such [s]tate does not want the amendments made by such sections to apply with respect to loans made in such [s]tate”).
 The first reference to any sort of a valid-when-made doctrine can be found in a 2012 brief in a California rent-a-bank case involving First Bank of Delaware. Defendant First Bank of Delaware’s Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Production of Documents at 4, People v. Check’n Go of California, Inc. (No. CGC-07-462779), 2012 Cal. Sup. Ct. Motions LEXIS 42469, at *7 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 11, 2012) [hereinafter Defendant First Bank of Delaware’s Supplemental Brief]. First Bank of Delaware was the rent-a-bank partner of Think Finance. Levitin, supra note 3, at 372. But the claim in that case was only that the doctrine existed as a matter of California case law and the California constitution. Defendant First Bank of Delaware’s Supplemental Brief, supra, at *7.
 See generally Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 237 F. Supp. 3d 130 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 7:11-cv-8149).
 Hearing Transcript at 9:21-25, Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 237 F. Supp. 3d 130 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 7:11-cv-8149) (Dkt. No. 80-1). See also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15–16, Midland Funding, LLC v. Madden, 136 S. Ct. 2505 (2016) (No. 15-610), 2015 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4061 at *28–30.
 Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 16, Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-2131-cv).
 Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc by Defendants-Appellees, Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 86 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-2131-cv).
 Id. at 7–9.
 Brief of the Clearing House Ass’n, LLC, Fin. Servs. Roundtable, Consumer Bankers Ass’n, & Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n as Amici Curiae in Support of Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 5–6 & n.4, Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 86 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-2131-cv) [hereinafter Brief of Clearing House Ass’n] (citing Gaither v. Farmers & Mechs. Bank of Georgetown, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 37, 43 (1828) and Nichols v. Fearson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 103, 109 (1833), as well as Watkins v. Taylor, 16 Va. (2 Munf.) 424, 436 (1811); Munn v. Comm’n Co., 15 Johns. 44, 55 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818); Tuttle v. Clark, 4 Conn. 153 (1822); Tate v. Wellings (1790) 100 Eng. Rep. 716, 721 (opinion of Buller, J.); and Blackstone, supra note 57, at 355, 379 n.32. Similar claims, albeit in slightly weaker form, were also found in another amicus brief. Brief of the Structured Fin. Indus. Grp., Inc., and the Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees’ Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 8–9, Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 86 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-2131-cv) (citing Nichols, 32 U.S. at 109 for one of the “cardinal rules in the doctrine of usury” (quoting Nichols, 32 U.S. at 109)).
 Regarding Watkins, 16 Va. at 436, see supra text accompanying note 54. Regarding Munn, 15 Johns. at 55 and Tuttle, 4 Conn. 153, see supra text accompanying note 37. Regarding Tate, 100 Eng. Rep. at 721 (opinion of Buller, J.), see supra note 50. Regarding Blackstone’s Commentaries, see supra note 57.
 Brief of Clearing House Ass’n, supra note 102, at 5–7.
 See Alan Feuer, Trauma Surgeon of Wall Street, N.Y. Times (Nov. 13, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/15/nyregion/15cohen.html [https://perma.cc/2S99-GJ7T].
 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 24, at 4, 8.
 It is unclear how the work on the brief was allocated between the Solicitor General’s Office and the OCC, and how much of the OCC’s contribution was prepared in coordination with financial services industry trade associations. Additionally, the misinterpretation of the nineteenth century cases might have reflected a lack of familiarity with the practice of indorsement of credit instruments, which could be a symptom of the decline in the teaching of commercial law in American law schools. See Larry T. Garvin, The Strange Death of Academic Commercial Law, 68 Ohio St. L.J. 403, 404 (2007) (noting commercial law as a dying field in the American legal academy).
 See, e.g., Defendant PayDayOne, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint at 13, Pennsylvania v. Think Fin., No. 2:14-cv-07139-JCJ (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2015).
 Brief of Amici Curiae Bank Pol’y Inst., the Structured Fin. Ass’n, the Am. Bankers Ass’n, the Consumer Bankers Ass’n, & the Chamber of Com. of the U.S. in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, California v. FDIC, No. 4:20-cv-5860 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2021) (Dkt. No. 70).